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Executive Summary 
IN THIS PAPER, we analyze microfinance institutions (MFIs) as businesses, asking how some 
MFIs succeed in reducing and covering costs, earning returns, attracting capital, and scaling up. 
We are interested in MFIs that are financially self-sufficient (covering the cost of daily 
operations as well as the cost of capital at a commercial rate) or merely operationally self-
sufficient (not covering capital costs) or only, say, 90% operationally self-sufficient. All such 
MFIs strive for efficiency and are in many respects businesslike. 
Our interest in commercial success does not mean that we believe that it is the raison d'être of 
microfinance. The ultimate impact on borrowers and communities is what matters for MFI 
leaders and staffers, as well as for nearly all their investors, by which we mean those who put 
money in, public or private, through grants, loans, or equity. We focus here on commercial 
success because viewing MFIs as practical solutions to challenging business problems is a good 
place to start in understanding why most microfinance operates in the ways it does, what impact 
it is having, and how it can realistically be expected to enhance its impact. 
Based on a survey of existing literature and interviews with key microfinance players—
academics, MFI executives, industry analysts in MFI rating agencies, and investors (see 
Appendix)—we strive to uncover the major innovations in product design and management 
techniques that have allowed MFIs to offer financial products to a clientele that had been 
deemed too poor, too risky, and too costly for banks to serve. We also survey contextual factors 
such as economic and political conditions that hinder or facilitate microfinance. 
Although the capacity of the poor to borrow and save is counterintuitive for some people, their 
need to do so is actually greater than for better-off people. Precisely because their incomes are 
tight, and often volatile, financial services that help them fill in mismatches between income and 
consumption needs can be a matter of survival. And though seemingly opposite, lending and 
savings are similar in helping households manage these mismatches. They can both help people 
accumulating capital for investment too. 
Thus in commercial terms, there is a market for microfinance. But to serve that market on a 
sustainable basis, and grow, MFIs must push costs below revenues, or at least bring them close 
enough that the need for subsidy does not throttle growth. That requires solving some tough 
business problems. Key microfinance business challenges include: 
• Building volume. 
• Keeping loan repayment rates high. 
• Retaining customers. 
• Minimizing scope for fraud in branches. 
Since the 1970s, MFI innovators have invented or discovered clever solutions to the microfinance 
business problem. Some have built huge organizations that serve millions of clients and have 
demonstrated an impressive capacity for change—all that, to boot, in places with weak stocks of 
infrastructure and human capital. The individual innovations in product design and management 
have spread both through a Darwinian process of selection—the techniques that worked are  
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found in the large MFIs because they help them become large—and through cultural diffusion, as 
other MFIs imitated the most successful ones. At barely 30 years old, microfinance is hardly as 
refined as the human eye after millions of years of evolution: the tinkering goes on. 
In surveying the diversity of microfinance today, the paper looks at three kinds of success 
factors: design of products, such as group lending, individual lending, and savings; management 
techniques that build organizations to deliver these services on a large scale; and environmental 
factors that make some countries hospitable to microfinance and others not. 
 
Products 
THE TERM "MICROFINANCE" includes the provision of a wide range of financial services to the 
poor: savings, insurance, money transfers, and credit. The microfinance movement to date, 
however, has generally favored microcredit, so much of our analysis is devoted to that. 
The dominant types of microcredit can be seen as arrayed along a spectrum. At one end, loans 
are smaller, relatively more costly to provide, and are made practical by giving the job of client 
selection and monitoring to borrowers themselves. At the other end, loans are larger, cheaper to 
administer (relative to loan size), and less burdensome for the client. Moving to specifics, we 
discuss these features of product design: 
• Emphasis on credit over voluntary savings 
• Progressive lending—offering bigger loans to those who first repay small ones 
• (Group) lending to women 
• Frequent transactions and short loan terms 
• Matching interest rates to costs 
• Limited product offerings and streamlined procedures 
• Forced savings 
• Credit life insurance 
We conclude that much about how microfinance operates today can be explained by the 
commercial imperative to control costs while delivering services customers will buy.  
 
Management 
THE PRODUCT CHOICES outlined above are all fairly common; yet few MFIs can be called 
commercial success stories. In data from the years around 2000, 3% of MFIs, 73 of them, held 
80% of microloan accounts worldwide (a total of 40 million). This lopsided distribution shows 
that commercial success is about more than product design. It also requires effective 
management. The report groups management techniques under these headings: 
• Hiring, training, and firing with an eye toward inculcating a social mission and 
commitment to excellence 
• Going to the customer 
• Standardizing branch structure 
• Leadership ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  iii 
• Monitoring and incentives 
• Organizational capacity for learning 
The picture that emerges is of the successful MFI as a decentralized organization. Retail units go 
to the customer and are the locus of production. They are where relationships with clients are 
made and maintained, where services are provided, where much learning should take place about 
the effectiveness of current approaches, where growth can occur through splitting of units. 
Excessive intervention in branch activities would slow and demoralize workers. Management—
the center—picks and trains the right people; designs the products and the structure of local 
offices; gives them substantial operational autonomy for the sake of efficiency and morale; 
monitors their performance through strong management information systems (MIS); guides 
them by inculcating a culture of excellence and service and offering pay incentives; and seeks to 
learn continually from experience in the field. 
 
Enabling Environment 
ONLY TEN COUNTRIES had more than 3 microfinance accounts per 100 people circa 2000. 
Surely microfinance leaders such as Indonesia, Bolivia, and Bangladesh do not hold monopolies 
on microfinance know-how, talent, and initiative. Environmental factors such as government 
policies and economic circumstances must also be at play. Indeed, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that environmental factors explain more of the variation across countries than 
anything else. Among the factors: 
• Wage rates for loan officers relative to income of clients 
• Competition from the non-MFI private sector 
• Competition from subsidized government credit 
• Macroeconomic stability 
• The regulatory environment 
To a substantial extent, microfinance does appear to be a case in which the "field of dreams" 
approach —if you build it, they will come—works. If domestic governments set the stage and do 
not meddle, MFI entrepreneurs and investors will come. Economic circumstances, such as 
competition from consumer lenders in Brazil and high wages for skilled labor in Africa relative to 
the incomes of the poor, do narrow the scope for microfinance. 
 
Conclusions 
THAT MICROFINANCE TODAY is the outcome of an evolutionary process means that 
nontraditional entrants, such as commercial banks, need to exercise care in adopting established 
models. Models that were optimal for non-banks may not be optimal for banks. In particular, to 
the extent that the traditional emphasis on credit is an adaptive response to the difficulty that 
NGOs face in taking savings, rather than the demonstrably superior way to relieve the capital 
constraints of the poor and smooth their spending, banks entering microfinance should seriously ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  iv 
explore taking deposits. Savings can generate income, and do not impose the same risks as credit. 
Notably, the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI)—as a century-old bank, an anomaly within the 
microfinance world—had 32.3 million deposit accounts to 3 million loan accounts at end-2005. 
This study also casts an interesting sidelight on the contribution of microfinance to 
development. Essentially all investors in microfinance are looking at a "double bottom line"—
commercial success and social gain. The mere existence of BancoSol, Grameen, BRI, and other 
commercially successful MFIs is a kind of development in itself since they permanently enrich 
the institutional fabric of their countries. But many microfinance investors are searching for 
another kind of success: direct benefits for clients and their families. Yet rigorously derived 
evidence on how much microcredit helps people is surprisingly thin. Despite the growing 
clientele and high repayment rates, it is not as clear as we would like where and when microcredit 
improves lives. 
Microcredit, like all credit, helps some people—one hopes, the majority of clients. And like all 
credit, especially when pushed hard by suppliers, microcredit must hurt some clients too. This 
complexity is no more a reason to attack microcredit per se than is personal bankruptcy in rich 
countries a cause for banning credit cards or home mortgages. But in combination with the 
observation that commercial imperatives can explain so much about how microfinance is done, is 
a cause for reflection. For example, the historical emphasis among MFIs on credit rather than 
savings appears to have arisen for practical business reasons rather than because it has been 
shown that credit helps clients more. Microfinance investors should therefore work to 
understand how MFIs succeed on both bottom lines—as businesses and as agents of 
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Introduction 
TYPICAL ACCOUNTS OF microfinance history tell us that in the 1970s an imaginative 
experimenter— most often it is Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh, but sometimes it is workers 
for Acción International in Brazil or Opportunity International in Colombia—discovered that 
poor people will repay small loans.
1 It was a striking find and it induced an enthusiastic faith in 
the power of microcredit to lift the poor out of poverty. Almost three decades later, the 
microfinance movement boasts numerous success stories—small, grass root organizations that 
have grown phenomenally in size while maintaining high rates of profitability. The Grameen 
Bank, for example, today boasts a Nobel Prize, 1,700 branches, 16,000 employees, and 6 million 
customers, 96% of them women.
2 In Bolivia, BancoSol, with 62,000 borrowers, is a commercial 
offshoot of the non-profit PRODEM, which itself is descended from the world's first "solidarity 
group" lending experiments, by Acción.
 
Since the 1970s, several major methodologies have developed for delivering credit and other 
financial services to poor customers. The dollar sums transacted in these methodologies range 
from under $50 to over $1,000, and they help people do everything from buy food in a pinch to 
acquire sewing equipment for cottage manufacturing. What they have in common is a strong role 
for foreigners, who continue to both advise and invest—where by "invest" we mean provide 
grants, loans, or equity participation. On a global basis, microfinance institutions (MFIs) in fact 
provide a minority of financial services to the poor, mainly because of huge government programs 
in China, India, and Viet Nam.
3 But because of the opportunities they offer people in rich 
countries to invest and advise, and because of their rapid growth, MFIs are our focus. 
Enthusiasm about the power of microfinance to alleviate poverty has colored most accounts of 
the microfinance story. In this paper, however, we get away from the rhetoric around 
microfinance by focusing on the business choices of commercially successful microfinance 
institutions. This is not to imply that commercial success is all that matters for microfinance. 
The ultimate impact on borrowers and communities is what matters most, not least to the public 
and private donors and investors that support MFIs. Nor do we mean to engage in the debate 
about whether commercial success should be a priority. One can argue that it should be, for the 
sake of serving as many people as possible. But, as a counterexample, in Bolivia, ProMujer and 
Crecer bundle educational and health services with credit and believe that dropping the services 
for the sake of cost-cutting would undermine their mission to aid the poorest.
4 
Still, even ProMujer and Crecer have converged to a relatively commercial mode of operation. 
Thus, we believe that viewing MFIs as practical solutions to challenging business problems is a 
good place to start in understanding why they operate in the ways they do, and how they can 
realistically be expected to improve. As Pankaj Jain and Mick Moore write, "To properly 
appreciate the great achievements of the microcredit movement, one has to be more skeptical of 
its self-image than is normally considered polite or respectful."
5  
Based on a survey of existing literature and interviews with key players in the microfinance 
sector—academics, MFI executives, industry analysts in MFI rating agencies and investors—we 
strive to uncover the major microfinance innovations that have allowed MFIs to sustainably offer 
financial products to a clientele that had been deemed too poor, too risky and too costly to be ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  2 
served by banks in the past. In particular, we review the products that microfinance innovators 
have developed since the early 1970s to solve the business problem of delivering financial 
services, especially credit, at manageable cost to poor people. We go on to examine management 
techniques, from training to pay incentives, that they use to build and run effective organizations 
to deliver these services on a large scale. Finally, we investigate one of the tougher puzzles in 
microfinance, the environmental factors that appear to make some countries good homes for 
microfinance and others inhospitable. Why does Bolivia have more microfinance than Peru, 
Cambodia more than Vietnam, and Benin more than Nigeria? 
Our purpose is to provide a conceptual survey of this vast topic, which we do with great 
humility about the actual diversity of microfinance around the world. The big picture that 
emerges is of an interaction between human ingenuity and evolutionary dynamics. Microfinance 
leaders have found a suite of techniques in product design and management that solve the 
fundamental microfinance problems of controlling costs, building volume, keeping repayment 
high, and preventing internal fraud, all while operating in a poor country. Most of these 
techniques they have consciously designed. Others they have stumbled upon; but because they 
work, their organizations moved to the forefront of the microfinance movement, through a 
process of "natural" selection. But so hostile is the environment in many countries that 
microfinance has so far flourished only in a few places. 
1  Products 
THE TERM "MICROFINANCE" includes the provision of a wide range of financial services to the 
poor: credit, savings, insurance, and money transfers. The microfinance movement to date, 
however, has heavily favored microcredit, so much of our analysis focuses on innovations in 
credit delivery. Throughout, our interest is in how products are designed for financial 
sustainability, which is when MFIs cover operational costs, costs of capital, and loan losses. 
1.1  The core product types 
Group lending products are the ones most commonly associated in the public's mind with the 
microfinance revolution. They come in two major types: group and individual lending. 
1.1.1  Group lending 
In classic solidarity group lending, which both Acción International and the Grameen Bank 
developed, borrowers are asked to form groups of three to seven members, most commonly five. 
Borrowers in a group are jointly and severally liable for all loans taken out, meaning they are each 
liable for the others' loans and any one of them can be held fully responsible for an outstanding 
loan. Typically the pattern of disbursements and repayments is regimented. In the classic 
Grameen model, payments begin immediately after disbursement, are due weekly, and are 
constant over the life of the loan. Entry into the regimen is staggered within a group: first two 
borrowers take their loans and begin to repay, then two more, then the fifth. When a loan is 
repaid, the borrower becomes immediately eligible for a larger one as long as all group members ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  3 
are in good standing and approve the individual loan requests. In the classic model, eight 
solidarity groups are federated into a larger group called the "center," which gathers each week 
with a loan officer to perform all financial transactions. 
The other major type of group lending is village banking, and was developed in 1984 in Bolivia 
by John Hatch, who went on to found FINCA International. Village banks bring together 15 to 
30 people, give them a single loan, then delegate authority to them for on-lending to individual 
members. This delegation distinguishes village banking from most other forms of microfinance. 
Members elect the office holders of the village bank, who assume responsibility for conducting 
its affairs. Usually, loan sizes are allowed to differ among individual members. But all loans carry 
the same repayment and interest rate terms, and borrowers are generally offered a loan ladder, a 
sequence of 3 to 5 loan cycles with a maximum loan size specified for each cycle. For example, 
Compartamos, a profitable and fast-growing microfinance institution in Mexico, offers a three-
step loan ladder for its village banking product, with the first loan at most $150 and the third at 
most $1400.
6 Village bank members act as co-guarantors and help decide how much each person 
borrows. Because the groups are larger than solidarity groups, village banking more frequently 
faces the problems that arise when there are large spreads in loan size within the jointly liable 
group, which can expose the poorest members to inordinate risk. To protect them, most village 
banking MFIs try to keep the maximum-to-minimum loan ratio below 10.
7 
Though distinct, the two dominant forms of group lending have much in common. Both have 
regular, compulsory public meetings, typically weekly or biweekly, where loans are repaid and 
disbursed and savings collected. In both kinds of lending, it is not uncommon for the attending 
loan officer to refuse to end the meeting until all scheduled loan repayments are made—by 
someone. 
Economists have taken note of one traditional feature of both forms of group lending, joint 
liability. The theoretical literature has viewed joint liability as a major technological innovation 
that reduces problems arising from "informational asymmetries" between lender and borrower.
8 
In both village banking and solidarity lending, groups self-select. Given members' superior 
knowledge of the character and economic circumstances of friends and neighbors, they can do 
better than the lender at screening out risky borrowers prior to the loan decision and monitoring 
loan use after. 
 Though economists initially saw joint liability as the key innovation that kept repayment rates 
high, there were puzzling questions. If members knew that others in the group would make up 
their repayments if they defaulted, why don't they free ride on others and default more often? 
This highlights the peer pressure exercised in closed community groups, and the importance of 
reputation, honor, and shame. Honor is both a matter of public reputation and a private concept: 
the popularity of death insurance offered by some MFIs demonstrates that people in some 
cultures think they have failed their worldly and religious duties if they leave debt for their heirs. 
Case-studies have revealed that, MFIs that require joint liability usually do not enforce it. 
Instead, a common practice is to encourage other members of the solidarity group center—the 
larger or "secondary group" that is not party to the formal joint-liability clause—to make up the 
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Secondary groups play a more specific role in facilitating loan repayment in the initial phase 
of some programs. When a member can neither meet loan repayment schedules nor source 
other money for this purpose, field workers encourage her to take a short-term, interest free 
and typically informal (but publicly known) loan from other member(s) of the secondary 
group (not especially the primary group) and agree to repay installments in parallel with the 
program loan….In the longer established [MFIs] and secondary groups, willingness to provide 
such temporary loans has declined over time. In such cases…potential defaulters are expected 
to find alternate loan sources outside of the secondary group, and prior to the weekly group 
meeting to avoid disrupting it.
9 
This quote illustrates the multiple sources of peer pressure on the defaulter. First, the defaulter is 
identified in front of the entire village center. Second, she is put in a position where she must 
publicly ask for help. Third, she becomes responsible for the community center meeting being 
prolonged and any unpleasantness that might ensue. Lengthy meetings have been cited as an 
important reason clients drop out from group lending programs, so when a loan officer does not 
allow the meeting to end unless all defaults have been covered, it must add to the social 
pressure.
10 
The public nature of group lending and the resulting play of honor and shame thus appear to be 
more essential to timely repayment than formal joint liability. Consider the rapid growth of the 
Association for Social Advancement (ASA) in Bangladesh, which does group lending with 
individual liability. ASA's success is likely a reason that Grameen Bank dropped joint liability as 
part of its reforms around 2001, dubbed "Grameen II," but retained the rest of the credit 
delivery system, notably, regular public meetings.
11 Even MFIs that do not employ either joint 
liability or regular group meetings for transaction purposes tap into this sensitivity to reputation 
for delinquency control: XacBank in Mongolia posts names of clients and their installment 
repayment reports on the walls of its branches.
12 Peer pressure, it seems, is a broader concept 
than first assumed within a group liability context. It is not simply the pressure exerted by fellow 
group members who are afraid of losing access to future loans or having to cover loan 
delinquencies, it is pressure arising from public transactions in communities where individuals 
worry about reputations. And the discovery is not really new to microcredit; money lenders too 
have used public honor to motivate repayments. When interviewed, a woman street vendor who 
was a client of a group of moneylenders called "the Bombays" in the Philippines "noted that the 
Bombays always picked the busiest hour of the day to collect so that there would always be 
witnesses to her embarrassment."
13 
Experimental research is confirming the relative unimportance of formal joint liability. In an 
experiment run with the Green Bank of Caraga in the Philippines, Xavier Giné and Dean Karlan 
found that after borrowers in randomly chosen, ongoing solidarity groups were notified that joint 
liability had been dropped, repayment rates and other indicators of portfolio health showed no 
change in the following year—except that centers without joint liability attracted more new 
clients.
14 It remains to be seen whether joint liability is similarly unimportant in the earlier, group 
formation stage, where self-selection appears to screen out bad risks (adverse selection). The 
experiments reported so far have been done only by switching existing borrowers, who already 
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In sum, it is becoming clear that group lending works in part by substituting reputation for 
conventional collateral—in other words, collateralizing reputation. (Section 1.2.2 describes 
"forced savings" which also function as collateral for group lenders.) Group lending is public 
banking for the poor, in contrast with private banking for the rich. The growth of ASA and the 
Green Bank experiment suggest the obvious: the poor like joint liability no more than the rich 
and accept it only when they have no better option.  
A relative of village banking is the self-help group (SHG) system that dominates microfinance in 
India. The system evolved from the efforts of NGOs to organize the rural poor, especially 
women, into groups for purposes of social and economic empowerment through group savings, 
education, and microenterprise support. NGOs train the group in saving, lending, and 
accounting, then link the group with a bank where the it can deposit its accumulated savings into 
a collective account. The bank then grants a block loan to the group, typically four times as large 
as the savings balance, for which members are jointly and severally liable.
15 The group decides 
how, and on what terms, to distribute the loan to individual members. Self-help microfinance 
took off when the Indian government decided to support it through the National Bank for 
Agricultural Development (NABARD), which provides subsidized refinancing to banks for their 
lending to SHGs. Partly because several steps separate clients from NABARD, there are no 
national statistics on how many Indians participate in SHGs. In fiscal year 2004–05, 798,000 
SHGs received bank loans, 539,000 for the first time, bringing the cumulative number of SHGs 
receiving loans to 1.618 million.
16 At a typical 17 women per group, that suggests that up to 27 
million women have joined SHGs.
17 However, many of the SHGs may have gone defunct, and 
their members may have joined new groups, so this figure could be high by a factor of two or 
three. 
The success to date of SHGs in India is attributable to a combination of special factors: a 
proliferation of grass-root NGOs dedicated to the economic and social uplift of rural 
communities; a vast network of public-sector rural banks; the popular acceptance, even 
expectation, of state-subsidized poverty alleviation programs; and a committed champion in the 
NABARD. However, some of these same factors pose potential challenges to a further scaling up 
of the Bank Linkage Program, which still reaches only a small fraction of Indians. The central 
problem is the misalignment of incentives. Since the job of the partner NGOs is to form groups, 
not run them on an ongoing basis, they do not face the same financial incentives as MFIs to 
maintain portfolio quality. The professionalism and commitment to mission of the established 
NGOs that historically formed SHGs may have compensated for the perverse incentives. But as 
NABARD pushes for growth, the risk increases that new organizations will arise purely to form 
SHGs, and will not behave so well. In the worst case, they collude with borrowers against a 
lender for short-term gain. The misaligned incentives are why the private ICICI Bank, which has 
lent to 12,000 SHGs, is now moving to MFIs as a channel as it scales up in microfinance.
18 
1.1.2  Individual lending 
Individual lending is the other major type of microcredit methodology. As its name makes 
obvious, it is built around more conventional lending relationships with individual clients. But in 
contrast with conventional lending, individual microlending of course offers smaller loans, on the ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  6 
order of $1,000, and relies less on traditional sources of security, such as marketable collateral, 
credit bureaus, and formal legal recourse. It relies more on informal assessments of character and 
business operations. Group lending puts the burden of this assessment on the group through the 
group self-selection mechanism; individual lending depends on the loan officer to perform this 
screening. In dense urban areas, notably in Latin America, where social bonds may not be strong 
enough to support group lending, individual lending must tap into the borrower's social assets by 
forming a character sketch from interviews with friends, neighbors, and business associates. 
Gabriel Solorzano, President of Nicaragua's FINDESA, explains that his finance company 
extends not "asset-based credit" (ABC) but "integrity-based credit" (IBC).
19 Claus-Peter 
Zeitinger, founder of the German ProCredit juggernaut, which now operates in Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, and Africa, echoes Solorzano, calling his loans "information-based credit."
20 
Those phrases accentuate the contrast with conventional lending. But from the standpoint of 
group lending, individual lending looks relatively conventional. Indeed, there is no sharp line 
between individual microlending and more-conventional small business lending. Loan officers do 
assess clients' business operations with an eye toward current earnings and potential earnings if 
the proposed investment is made. They do often accept or require physical collateral, mortgages, 
or credit scoring. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), one of the world's largest microlenders, only 
lends individually, and requires titles to land, buildings, motorcycles, or other property as 
collateral.
21 Given the low market value of most assets pledged, however, MFIs prefer to use such 
collateral as a threat rather than a way to cover losses from default. The incentive to repay is 
rooted in the high replacement cost of the pledged asset to the household and by the borrower's 
desire to avoid the social shame of having his or her household items seized in front of family and 
neighbors. As Solorzano puts it, FINDESA "doesn't want a used, rusty refrigerator. We lose two-
thirds of the value when we seize collateral."
22 It is only when lending to small or medium 
enterprises that loan sizes may be large enough for collateral to become valuable in the 
traditional sense. 
1.1.3  A conceptual framework for microcredit methodologies 
This bare-bones introduction to microcredit offerings does not convey their full complexity, 
variety, and dynamism. Nor does it touch on other financial services, including savings, insurance, 
and transfers, that MFIs are increasingly offering. It suffices, however, to ground an important 
observation about the nature of the challenge for microfinance practitioners, and their response 
to the challenge. Specifically, the dominant microcredit products can be seen as arrayed along a 
spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, loans are smaller, more costly to provide relative to loan 
size, and are only made practical by shifting certain tasks onto borrowers. At the other end, loans 
are larger, cheaper for the MFI to administer, and more convenient for the customer. They also 
go to the relatively better-off. 
In general, lenders face three costs: financial (costs of capital), default (which appears in 
accounting through loan loss provisioning), and operational or transaction costs. The last two are 
more under the MFI's control, and the last is disproportionately high for small loans, thus 
dominating in microfinance. A $100 loan does not cost ten times less to administer than a $1,000 
loan. So the poorer the borrower, and the smaller the appropriate loan, the higher the cost per ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  7 
dollar lent. Figure 1, based on data from MFIs reporting to the MicroBanking Bulletin (MBB) for 
2004, shows that village banking has the highest costs relative to the amount lent while 
individual lending has the least. To rein in costs per loan and make small loans practical, lenders 
must squeeze operating costs where they can and shift costs that remain onto borrowers. Figure 2 
shows the result: on a per-loan basis, village banking MFIs keep their spending the tightest, 
although its delegation of responsibility is also a form of empowerment. Solidarity group lending 
puts somewhat fewer costs onto borrowers, since loan officers work directly with all clients and 
shoulder some responsibility for collection from borrowers having difficulties. It compensates by 
imposing more routine on the credit relationship, in order to speed transactions. Individual 
microlenders absorb much more of the underwriting, monitoring, and enforcement costs 
themselves. In viewing these Figures, bear in mind that all but a core of dedicated poverty-
focused solidarity lenders have moved into the mixed individual-solidarity category, and may not 
be representative of solidarity lending per se. For example, the true typical loan size for solidarity 
lending is probably between those shown in Figure 2 for solidarity lenders and mixed ones, and 
above that for village banking, as is the case in a 1999–2002 sample reported by Robert Cull, Asli 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Jonathan Morduch.
23 
Important subcomponents of the potentially transferable operating costs are for underwriting 
(loan approval), monitoring of use and repayment, and enforcement.
24 Group lending shifts these 
responsibilities onto borrowers. Borrowers in turn will only accept them to the extent that they 
need capital and have no better alternative. And it is the poorest who have the fewest 
alternatives. The less-poor, on the other hand, will opt for individual lending and larger loans. 
(See Figure 3.) This pattern is of course universal in service businesses: the less you are willing to 
pay, the less you are catered to. 
The bottom line in the bargaining between lenders and borrowers are that individual lending is 
unattractive for lenders at the low end of the loan scale as too expensive, while group lending is 
unattractive to borrowers at the high end as too burdensome. As a result, village and solidarity 
banking serve the poorest while individual lending goes more to the less poor. Table 1 has the 
numbers behind these charts. 
These data suggest that commercially successful microfinance programs are designed not just 
to maximize direct impact on their clients. It is not simply the case that village banking, say, is 
more prevalent in rural Mexico than individual microcredit because village banking, with its 
emphasis on empowerment, happens to do a better job of helping rural Mexicans. Rather, in a 
successful MFI, the choice of basic product type is an adaptive responsive to what could be 
called the business environment. Central to the adaptation is a choice about how much cost to 
ask clients to bear. ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  8 
Figure 1. Expenses as a share of outstanding loans by lender type (median), MicroBanking Bulletin survey, 2004 
 
Figure 2. Expenses per loan by lender type (median), MicroBanking Bulletin survey, 2004 
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Figure 3. Loan sizes in dollars and fraction of GNI/capita by lender type (median), MicroBanking Bulletin survey, 2004 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of MFIs reporting to the Microbanking Bulletin survey, 2004 (medians) 
Type Financial  Loan loss 
provision 
Operating Total
1 Dollars % of GNI per Capita
Individual 104 7.8          1.7              12.9          24.6       1,084                  59.5                     
Mixed Individual-Solidarity 132 5.2          1.2              17.8          25.9       359                    44.6                     
Solidarity 32 5.8          0.9             22.7          30.3       92                      14.0                      
Village Banking 34 7.0          1.0              32.4          39.8       139                     20.8                     
1Previous columns do not sum to totals because median totals differ from total medians.




Expenses (% of assets) Average loan balance per Borrower
 
1.2  Aspects of product design 
HAVING INTRODUCED THE major product methodologies and a way to think about them, we 
embark on a more thematic survey of product design, still with an interest in choices that have 
been made that advance microfinance as a business proposition. Although this is not our focus 
here, some of these design choices, such as targeting women, may also directly serve social ends. 
The business problem for MFIs can be stated most broadly as finding ways to keeps costs near 
or below revenues—but that generalization is vacuous and needs unpacking. The real challenges 
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• Building volume. The ability to spread fixed costs of lending operations over a 
large portfolio helps lenders reduce their operating costs as a percentage of assets 
(outstanding loans). 
• Keeping loan repayment rates high. Searching for defaulters and cajoling or 
threatening them into repaying is extremely expensive for small loans. Moreover, 
especially with group lending, default can spread, since people will ask, "Why 
should I repay if she did not?" This contagion effect is a downside of the 
intimacy of group lending; it puts a premium on near-perfect repayment rates. 
• Retaining customers. Even the most efficient MFIs find it hard to cover costs on 
the smallest accounts; most need to cross-subsidize them from larger loans to 
clients who have proven their ability to pay. This makes it essential for MFIs to 
grow with their customers, moving to progressively larger accounts. 
• Charging rates commensurate with costs. High interest rates are a well-known and 
controversial aspect of microfinance. But MFIs cannot succeed in the 
commercial sense if they do not cover their costs, or at least come close, so that 
subsidy dependence does not limit scale. 
• Compliance with prudential regulation. Banking regulations have much to say on 
what financial institutions can and cannot do. Most MFIs, for example, can only 
take deposits from people who are borrowing even more from them at the same 
time. 
• Minimizing scope for fraud. In large organizations composed of small branches 
physically linked by weak transportation and communications infrastructure, 
monitoring branch activities to prevent internal fraud is a major challenge, all the 
more so in countries with a culture of corruption in business and government. 
The remainder of this section explores ways that MFIs have met these challenges. Two points 
should be borne in mind throughout. First, none of the strategies discussed is truly essential for 
sustainability: for every strategy, there are MFIs that eschew it yet succeed. Second, some were 
developed or copied by people who saw them as primarily serving a social mission. Through an 
evolutionary process of selection, however, those strategies still came to the fore for what were 
essentially business reasons. We suggest below, for example, that the focus on women in group 
lending arose through a process of experimentation in the late 1970s at what became the 
Grameen Bank, as the institution discovered that women were easier to work with than men in 
rural Bangladesh. Some Grameen imitators are probably unaware of this history and lend to 
women purely out of reasons of social mission.
25 Similarly, the dominance of credit itself seems to 
have arisen for practical reasons, yet some now call it a human right.
26 
1.2.1  Credit versus voluntary savings 
Stuart Rutherford eloquently reminds us that "financial services for poor people are largely a 
matter of mechanisms that allow them to convert a series of savings into usefully large lump 
sums."
27 Most poor people do set aside money, if in small amounts and irregularly, not because 
they have income left after meeting basic needs, but because their needs include larger purchases ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  11 
like medicine or clothing or spending at religious and family ceremonies that cannot be matched 
by the uneven trickle of income. Indeed, while the capacity of the poor to borrow and save may 
be surprising, their need to do so is greater than it is for the better-off. Precisely because their 
incomes are tight, ways to manage mismatches between often-volatile incomes and consumption 
can be a matter of survival. 
Saving and borrowing, though seemingly opposite, are actually similar in helping households 
convert small payments into larger lump sums.
28 Which is better depends on the use for which 
the lump sum is needed. If funds are required for household consumption smoothing in the 
presence of volatile income, then savings may be a cost-effective, less risky alternative to 
borrowing. If, on the other hand, funds are needed for investment, then credit provides quicker 
income gains. 
Microcredit is commonly defined as a vehicle for microenterprise. Numerous stories of clients 
who have struggled out of poverty by their own entrepreneurial efforts have been documented. 
Assuming that microcredit finances microenterprise, then the willingness of the poor to keep 
borrowing at high interest rates suggests that rates of return on borrowers' projects are even 
higher. In fact, microcredit often finances consumption. It is generally accepted that many poor 
people borrow at even higher interest rates from moneylenders for consumption, so willingness 
to pay cannot be assumed to demonstrate profitability of investments. In practice, MFIs, like 
moneylenders, require high-frequency, regimented payments on a schedule unrelated to the 
gestation periods of investments. And when MFIs do directly assess repayment capacity, they do 
so based on current income and assets rather than assumed returns from the proposed 
investment. Since money is fungible, it can appear to go for one purpose while actually serving 
another. If a borrower would have used her own funds to invest in a cow but instead takes out a 
loan for that purpose, then what the loan really does is let her put her own funds to some other, 
new purpose. In general, no sharp line separates the financial affairs of a poor household from 
the enterprises its members pursue. MFIs cannot expect their loans to only finance investment. 
Direct surveys of clients reveal a wide spectrum of uses.
29 
Though contrary to the original spirit of microenterprise lending, borrowing to finance and 
smooth consumption can be a very good thing.
30 In a study of a payday lender in South Africa 
(not ordinarily considered an MFI, but analogous in offering short-term loans without collateral 
to poor people), Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman find that extending credit to applicants who 
would otherwise just miss qualifying reduces the number of times someone in the family goes to 
bed hungry.
31 
But to the extent that clients borrow to smooth consumption, voluntary savings seemingly 
offers a viable alternative, since it equips poor households to manage income volatility without 
the stress of debt. Ideally then, clients should have opportunities to save along with opportunities 
to borrow. To quote Malcolm Harper, chairman of India's Basix Finance Group, "most people, 
including the poor, want to have savings nearly all the time and to be in debt less frequently."
32 
Researchers have confirmed that even the poorest households are willing and able to save, and 
that the existing informal methods (jewelry, cash-under-the-mattress, rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs), etc.) do not provide sufficient means for them to save. They carry 
considerable risks, of theft, inflation, fall in asset prices after natural disasters, and so on.
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while the ability of the poorest to profitably utilize credit for microenterprise is still an open 
empirical question, the desirability of promoting savings to act as buffers against income 
volatility, especially for households for whom such volatility can threaten survival, cannot be 
denied.
34 
Why then has the microfinance movement emphasized credit over voluntary savings? From the 
point of view of the MFIs, credit is more practical in several ways. First, there are, appropriately, 
fewer regulatory barriers to lending than to taking deposits. A small NGO cannot and should not 
easily become a bank (though the requirements for getting a banking license are arguably too 
stringent in many countries, as section 3.2.5 discusses). Second, and in the same vein, it is harder 
for an MFI to persuade people to trust it with their savings than to borrow from it. Third, for 
lenders, the regularity and uniformity of repayment schedules speeds transactions at weekly 
meetings, and may also increase total financial flow. Finally, credit imposes discipline and 
routine, which encourages clients to repay more regularly than they might save. 
From the perspective of the borrower, the discipline provided by regular payments can be 
useful in maintaining commitments to put aside funds for specific purposes when faced with 
competing uses and demands from other family members. It is for this reason that popular 
savings schemes such as rotating savings and credit associations rely on regular, compulsory 
contributions.
35 Joining the ROSCA is a voluntary decision, but once in, members have to meet 
fixed payments, and, much like the loan repayment schemes, both shame and loss of access to 
future finances provide the motivation to stick to the payment schedule. 
A final factor in favor of credit is that credit programs are more investible from the point of 
view of public and private donors and other investors. Ironically, the greater need of credit 
programs for outside capital may make it easier to attract it from official donors and socially 
minded investors, who often feel a perverse career incentive to disburse larger amounts with less 
staff time. With the same effort, a donor could place $100 million in a lending program or $10 
million in a savings program. 
All that said, the dominance of credit appears to be waning among MFIs that serve people at 
the poverty line, as opposed to well below it. Of the 302 MFIs included in the 2004 MBB data, 
89 (29%) reported voluntary savings in excess of 20% of total assets. This figure will probably rise 
as more microfinance organizations become banks, and as more banks enter microfinance. 
Foremost among the savings-taking institutions is BRI, whose Unit system held $3.6 billion in 
savings for 32.3 million people at the end of 2005, ten times the number who had loans.
36 
Notably, BRI is a century-old institution, government-run at the birth of its microfinance 
program in the mid-1980s, and now government-controlled, though partly privatized. It never 
faced prudential barriers in taking microsavings, nor needed outside capital. The ProCredit 
group, which provides "banking for ordinary people," not necessarily the poorest, now boasts $1.7 
billion in deposits against $2 billion in outstanding loans.
37 In Bangladesh, in a startling 
development, Grameen saw its savings "portfolio" exceed its loan portfolio at the end of 2004. 
The icon of microcredit now does more savings than credit. However, the growth appears driven 
by the popularity among less-poor Bangladeshis of its Grameen Pension Savings (GPS) 
commitment savings product, which pays out after five or ten years at an annualized rate of 12%. 
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example of savings emphasis for the very poor operates in the slums of Dhaka: SafeSave's workers 
visit clients daily in their homes to collect deposits as small as 1 taka (1.5 cents). But such services 
have yet to reach the scale of group lending for the very poor. 
Several MFI heads interviewed for this paper said they preferred savings as a source of capital 
because it comes with fewer strings attached and less managerial hassle than donor and investor 
money. The biggest constraint to mobilizing savings may not be the shortage of savers in poor 
communities, but rather the ability to lower transaction costs of small deposits and manage 
liquidity. It is in the latter that downscaling banks (traditional banks moving into microfinance) 
might have an advantage over small-scale MFIs. Apart from the regulatory issues regarding 
deposit-taking institutions, such as minimum capital requirements, which tend to favor a larger 
scale of operations, the ability to manage liquidity requires the type of back-office support and 
expertise that is not otherwise necessary for credit-only organizations. As early as its sixth year of 
operation, in 1989, BRI achieved self-sufficiency in funding: it mobilized $533 million in savings 
against a loan portfolio of $471 million. Deposits continued to increase relative to loans in 
subsequent years, with an average deposit-to-loan ratio of almost 2:1, and the excess savings were 
channeled into loans to larger corporations.
38 
1.2.2  Dynamic incentives 
Almost all MFIs start small with new clients, offer bigger loans if the first ones are repaid, and so 
on. Group lenders, in particular, follow highly standardized and rigid loan ladders which specify a 
maximum loan size for each loan cycle. Economists say that these expanding cycles create a 
"dynamic incentive" for clients, because what a client does today affects her options tomorrow. 
Jain and Moore point out that in solidarity lending, staggering the entry of group members into 
the lending cycle amplifies dynamic incentives. For at any given time, at least one member is just 
a few months away from repaying one loan and getting a bigger one. She has a particular 
incentive to keep the group going by making sure all her fellow members remain in good 
standing. 
Progressive lending, by gingerly testing the waters with a new client, can also be viewed as 
another way to winnow out risky customers. As a rule of thumb, because of economies of scale in 
loan size, MFIs do not fully cover their costs until the third or fourth loan to a client.
39 But 
progressive lending is also worrying, in that for borrowers who lack the capacity to repay, it may 
create a powerful incentive to go to a second lender—a moneylender or another MFI—for a 
bridge loan, to be repaid as soon as the new, larger loan comes through from the first lender. It 
can thus feed a cycle of debt, concealing, deferring, and exacerbating the ultimate confrontation 
with trouble. Successful MFIs therefore cannot rely on dynamic incentives alone to keep the 
portfolio healthy, but must also use other mechanisms, whether the "shame factor" of group 
lending, networking in the community, or ongoing assessment of repayment capacity to check 
unsustainable loan growth. 
More generally, lenders create dynamic incentives whenever they offer better loan terms down 
the road as a reward for on-time repayment today. In another experiment in South Africa, for 
example, Karlan and Zinman found that offering a borrower a lower interest rate on his next 
consumer loan had a huge impact on repayment of the current one.
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Individual lenders have harnessed dynamic incentives most effectively because they do not 
have to deal with the restrictive loan ladders of group lending and can more freely tailor 
individual loans in terms of lending periods, interest rates, and repayment schedules. And in 
scaling up, they do not need to worry about imposing inordinate risk on poorer, jointly liable 
fellow borrowers. 
1.2.3  Lending to women 
The face of microfinance is usually a woman's. Some MFIs, like Crecer in Bolivia and Kashf in 
Pakistan, lend exclusively to women.
41 But while 89% of the borrowers of the median solidarity 
group lender and 94% of the village banking lender are female (in the 2004 MBB survey), only 
54% of borrowers of the median individual lender are. (See Figure 4.) Why the gender split 
between individual and group lenders? One reason may be that it is a matter of mission. Poverty-
focused, group-oriented MFIs target women with their tiny loans because their oppression only 
compounds their poverty in limiting options in life. And women are more likely to channel the 
support to their children. The larger loans of individual lenders may go more for enterprise 
investment than consumption smoothing, and men dominate in the sphere of commerce. 
Figure 4. Share of borrowers who are women by lender type (median), MicroBanking Bulletin survey, 2004 
 
 
However deserving and appropriate women may be for microcredit, this is not the only reason 
they have gotten more of it. MFIs that target women draw inspiration from Grameen. But in 
Grameen's early years, men actually dominated. As Yunus and his team refined the methodology, 
they shifted toward women. The focus became official in 1985.
42 (See Figure 5.) BRAC, the giant 
Bangladeshi NGO, moved on the same path after it entered microcredit.
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field work in Bangladesh, anthropologist Aminur Rahman of the University of Manitoba came to 
the conclusion that the immediate reason for the move toward women was practical. For cultural 
reasons, women were more sensitive to protecting the reputations of their families, perhaps 
precisely because of their relative lack of power. As a result, in rural Bangladesh, at least, they 
repay more reliably. One loan officer explained to him that, "In the field it is hard to work with 
male members. They do not come to meetings, they are arrogant, they argue with the bank 
workers and sometimes even threaten and scare the bank workers." Women, he was told, are 
more vulnerable and submissive, and less mobile, thus easier to track down if they do not pay. 
The very attractiveness of the public meetings for women largely barred from public fora may 
give MFIs leverage.
44 A woman put it to Rahman this way: 
When a woman fails to make her instalment [sic] on time, she experiences humiliation 
through verbal aggression from fellow members and bank workers in the loan center. 
Such humiliation of women in a public place gives males in the household and in the 
lineage a bad reputation (durnam). In an extreme case peers may take the defaulter to the 
bank office. For a man, if he is locked inside the bank building for several days it would 
mean almost nothing to other people in the village. But if this happens to a woman then 
it will bring durnam to her household, lineage and village. People in other villages will also 
gossip about it.
45 
Reinforcing this picture is Rahman's finding that 60% of the women in his sample joined 
Grameen at the request of their husbands, and another 12% did so at the request of other men. 
Then, about 60% of the time, men in the household decided how the loans were used. In 
another sample of microcredit borrowers in Bangladesh, not just of Grameen, Anne Marie Goetz 
and Rina Sen Gupta found that 63% of borrowers had partial, very limited, or no control over the 
use of loan funds.
46 
None of this proves that microfinance does not help women. That women are repaying year 
after year hints that they use the money more responsibly and productively than men on average. 
That women have been gathering week after week to conduct business in group meetings is 
changing Bangladeshi norms about women's use of public space. That 37% of women did control 
loan use may be a victory for female empowerment. But the data also show that women are often 
conduits for loans to men. MFIs' preference for working with and through women strongly 
suggests that they do so in part because it helps them solve a business problem. "It is not a 
philosophical thing; it is very practical," says Carlos Labarthe, co-CEO of Mexico's 
Compartamos.
47 98% of Compartamos clients are female.
48 So does the minimal gender tilt 
among individual lenders. And as we emphasized at the outset, the business logic can operate 
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Figure 5. Share of members who are women, Grameen Bank, 1976–2005 
 
1.2.4  Frequent transactions and short loan terms 
Borrowers use microcredit for a wide variety of uses, from financing weddings to paying for day-
to-day consumption needs to investing in productive activities. Investment activities in turn 
range from substituting for high-interest supplier's credit, which can pay dividends in a single 
day, to buying calves that will not generate returns for months. Yet microloans almost always 
require frequent, regular payments that start immediately after disbursement. And they usually 
mature with six or twelve months. Microcredit, then, is poorly matched to many common 
investments.  
Clearly the frequent payments and short terms are pragmatic. Allowing microcredit borrowers 
to pay all principal and accumulated interest in a single transaction years after disbursement 
would invite disaster, just as it would for home mortgages. Much of the discipline that one hopes 
for from a loan would evaporate. Likewise, the need to immediately repay filters out prospective 
clients in the same way as forced savings. Thus, microcredit often restricts itself to those who 
already have enough income to repay the loan from other sources, regardless of the success of any 
new enterprise they pursue.
49 Again, we see MFIs designing a structure that selects less- risky 
borrowers and elicits compliance from them. 
1.2.5  Matching rates to costs 
The microfinance world was once intensely divided over the question of whether interest rates 
ought to be subsidized, to help the poorest, or not, so that MFIs can grow faster. The debate 
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sufficiency. We do not take a position on that question. Rather, we merely observe that if the 
objective is commercial viability—or being close enough to it that the need for subsidy does not 
throttle growth—rates must be high enough to cover most or all costs. In accepting this 
mathematical reality, we recognize that there is such a thing as interest rates that too are high—
though defining the threshold is both difficult and beyond the scope of this paper. 
How high the interest rates actually are in any particular case can be difficult to ascertain. 
Indeed, one has to conclude that one common design strategy is to obscure the true cost. 
Perhaps for simplicity, MFIs often state their interest rates on a "flat" basis—that is, relative to 
the original loan amount. But if an MFI makes a $100 loan to be repaid in equal installments over 
50 weeks, then over the course of the year the average balance is only about $50. Thus the 
effective interest rate, relative to the average balance, is about twice what it appears to the naïve. 
In addition, MFIs may charge origination fees, force savings that earn below-market interest or 
none at all (section 1.2.7), or sell credit life insurance at high prices (section 1.2.8). The best, 
systematically collected measure of the interest rate, then, may be the gross portfolio yield, an 
MFI's ratio of income on loans to loans outstanding. In the 2004 MBB sample of 302 MFIs, 
individual lenders reported a gross portfolio yield of 32.0% at the median (24.9% after adjusting 
for inflation), while solidarity lenders charged 41.7% (32.7% after inflation) and village banks 
48.9% (39.1% after inflation). These figures understate the actual charges to the generally slight 
extent that arrears reduce yield. Since they are medians, half the solidarity lenders earn more than 
41.7% and half the village banks earn more than 48.9%. 
Of course, raising rates does not automatically improve financial performance, since high prices 
can deter customers. Rajeev Dehejia, Heather Montgomery, and Jonathan Morduch confirmed 
that principle for microfinance by studying how demand for credit from SafeSave varies with the 
interest rate. (SafeSave is mentioned above in section 1.2.1. It lends as well as takes deposits.) The 
researchers found that a 1% increase in interest charges (not a 1 percentage point increase) 
reduced uptake of credit by 0.25% in the short run and 1.18% in the long run.
50 Moreover, higher 
rates can exacerbate a form of adverse selection. As the rate goes up, potential borrowers with 
safe, predictable investment plans drop out because they know they will not be able to earn 
enough to cover the interest charges. That leaves a pool of clients with riskier plans, who have a 
shot at covering the interest but also greater chance of failure and default.
51 
Given the contradictory effects of raising rates, the overall effect is an empirical matter. A 
separate study by Robert Cull, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch finds that within the observed 
range of variation for individual lenders, higher rates do correlate with greater financial self-
sufficiency. Notably, this result combines with the study just cited to demonstrate that the 
feared trade-off at the heart of the traditional debate over interest rate policy, between outreach 
and financial viability, is real. Meanwhile, Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch find no 
relationship between interest rates and financial returns among group lenders. It may be that the 
group lender sample is too small to pick up such effects. Or the low-income customers of group 
lending may be more sensitive to interest rates, so that increases in revenue per client are offset 
by loss of clients. Or more group lenders may be heavily subsidized, thus insulated from market 
forces, so that income from higher rates is dissipated by administrative inefficiency. Overall, 
higher rates do not appear to hurt financial self-sufficiency of either individual or group lenders ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  18 
within the observed range of variation. But they do not appear to help group lenders' finance on 
average either: the rise in income per client and the drop in clientele roughly cancel out. Where 
changing rates does not contribute much to commercial success, MFIs have to focus all the more 
on the cost side to achieve self-sufficiency. 
1.2.6  Limited product offerings and streamlined procedures 
An unfortunate side-effect of frequent transactions is high administrative burden. It is therefore 
imperative for MFIs to streamline transaction processing. One way to do this is to limit field 
officer travel time per client. In urban areas such as the Dhaka slums where SafeSave operates, it 
is practical for field workers to go door to door; SafeSave reports that its officers visit up to 200 
clients a day.
52 Field workers for individual lenders in urban Latin America also typically spend 
much of their time visiting clients where they live and work. But in somewhat less-dense areas, 
most MFIs insist that clients come partway to the loan officers, through regular meetings. Thus, 
in addition to making banking a public event, the meetings facilitate mass production. A group 
field worker can bicycle into a village, process a large number of transactions, and move on. In 
Bangladesh, workers follow highly regimented schedules, typically visiting two to three centers 
each morning to manage the weekly meetings. The loan repayments and savings collected at the 
meeting are taken back to the branch office at noon, where the worker logs all the transactions, 
leaving enough time in the late afternoon to follow up on either new group formation or 
members with payment arrears. 
If each center has 15–40 borrowers and meets weekly, each loan officer can manage at least 150 
clients (15 clients × 2 centers × 5 days) or, use midpoints the 2–3 and 15–40 ranges, 344 clients (27.5 
× 2.5 × 5). These estimates are comparable to the medians in the MBB: in 2004, village banks 
reported an average of 367 borrowers per loan officer and solidarity group MFIs had 287 
borrowers per loan officer. (See Table 2.) 
Table 2. Borrowers per loan officer by lender type (median), MicroBanking Bulletin survey, 2004 
Type
Number in sample Borrowers per loan officer
Individual 104 209                                     
Mixed Individual-Solidarity 132 220                                     
Solidarity 32 255                                     
Village Banking 34 307                                     




Another way to keep transactions efficient is to limit the diversity of product offerings. This is 
one reason why loans tend to have inflexible repayment schedules, and why associated products 
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MFIs have found it difficult to offer transaction accounts (like checking accounts) which give the 
client control over the timing and size of transactions. 
Vikram Akula, who founded SKS Microfinance in India after several years observing self-help 
groups and the Grameen Bank, sees his company's edge as being in transactional efficiency. SKS 
makes sure all loan payments are multiples of 5 rupees, the smallest bill, and accepts no coins.
53 
Loan officers enter meetings with pre-printed, computer-generated lists of expected 
transactions. Transactions are quickly logged into a computer database. The uniformity in 
process makes it easier for managers to monitor the data in order to detect irregularities and 
send in "SWAT teams" to handle them. (See section 2.5.) Irregularities can signify trouble or 
innovation on the ground that should be learned from.
54 SKS holds no monopoly on these 
practices; Bangladesh's ASA is also noted for its regimentation and efficiency. It is noteworthy 
that both MFIs are among today's fastest-growing. 
As with the dominance of credit over savings, which in a sense is another example of limiting 
service diversity, here too there are exceptions to the trend. Grameen II has brought a wider 
diversity of services, in no small part a response to competition, which shifts power to the client. 
So far, Grameen's loan officers appear to be handling the complexity.
55 SafeSave dedicates itself 
to serving the customer through flexibility, letting them decide how much to save each day. 
1.2.7  Forced savings 
A common element in classic solidarity groups and village banking is compulsory, or "forced," 
savings. Forced savings are collected during the group meetings, usually pay no interest, and 
cannot be withdrawn until the member exits the group. In effect, they accelerate loan repayment 
so that toward the end of a loan cycle, the MFI is actually in debt to its clients. Compartamos 
collects 10% of each loan and FINCA-Nicaragua collects 32% of the individual loan as forced 
savings. Compartamos collected the savings when a loan is granted and returns them at the end 
of the loan cycle. FINCA-Nicaragua, has borrowers make the savings in equal installments at 
meetings and does not returned them unless the borrower exits the village bank.
56 Both MFIs 
also have recourse to village bank forced savings in the case of loan default by a village bank 
member or if the entire village bank fails. 
  MFIs offer two main reasons for collecting forced savings: 1) to serve as cash collateral 
for loans, and 2) to inculcate the habit and discipline of regular saving. From the way forced 
savings are actually structured, however, the collateral explanation appears most compelling. The 
habit and discipline of regular saving can equally well be inculcated by offering voluntary time 
deposit accounts (analogous to certificates of deposit), or by commitment savings accounts, 
where each client chooses to commit to depositing a fixed sum at regular intervals. If, however, 
forced savings are premised that the poor are unwilling to save unless forced, then this is clearly a 
false premise since ample evidence now exists that the poor are both willing and able to save. 
  The cash collateral motive does make sense. Forced savings reduce MFI financial 
exposure when a village bank or a solidarity group center ceases to function. Indeed, the threat of 
losing savings can deter such failure. The fact that MFIs often do not return forced savings till a 
member leaves the program thus makes business sense. Similarly, using forced savings to cover 
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group center or village bank share the financial cost of default, social pressure is exerted on 
clients to make timely payments and to offer cross-loans to each other to cover the shortfall 
when difficulties arise. 
1.2.8  Credit life insurance 
In addition to compulsory savings, some group lenders require borrowers to buy credit life 
insurance, which covers their debts if they die. Grameen Koota, a solidarity group MFI in India, 
has members pay a total of 2% of the loan amount in equal weekly installments into an 
"Emergency Fund" that is used to write off the outstanding loan balance if the borrower dies. In 
addition, $11 (Rs. 500) are paid to the family for funeral expenses if the deceased borrower had 
been with the MFI for less than one year, and double that amount for a longer membership 
period.
57 
Like forced savings, credit insurance helps both clients and MFIs. It helps clients, of course, by 
reducing risk. It reduces risk for the group because the members are protected from having to 
choose between running after deceased's grieving family or covering the loss themselves. For the 
MFIs, it lowers the risk from death of borrower. It also earns fee income at low administrative 
expense. Indeed, Grameen Koota's 2% fee seems high when you consider that the break-even 
price of credit life insurance as a percentage of the loan balance, assuming no transaction costs, 
equals half the percentage of borrowers who can be expected to die during the loan repayment 
period. For example, if an MFI lends $100 each to 100 women and one can be expected to die—
on average, half-way though repayment—then the loss would be $50, or 0.5% of the $10,000 
total lent, and a 0.5% fee would cover insurance costs. Seen through this lens, the 2% fee on one-
year loans implies an expected death rate of 4%/year, which seems unrealistically high—or 
another way of raising the effective interest rate. 
FINCA-Uganda, a village banking MFI, has pioneered a life insurance product in Uganda that 
seems more forthright, costing less and offering more in a riskier environment, where HIV 
prevalence is high. It began in 1996 in partnership with the American Insurance Group (AIG). 
FINCA-Uganda charges its clients 1% of the loan amount as the cost of insurance, of which half 
is paid to AIG and half retained by FINCA. In the case of the client's accidental death, not only 
is the outstanding loan is written off but the heirs receive a substantial $1100. (If the death is not 
by accident, only the loan is written off.) There is a $600 pay-out for the accidental death of a 
spouse, and $300 for a child.
58 The product turned out to be so profitable that by 2004, AIG 
Uganda was selling credit life insurance through 26 MFIs in Uganda, Tanzania, and Malawi, and 
was projected to earn just under $200,000 from the product, 25% of total earnings.
59 
2  Management 
THE PREVIOUS SECTION surveyed how commercially successful MFIs design their products to 
solve the business problem of microfinance. Many of the choices they make, such as lending to 
women and requiring frequent repayments, are widely known and copied. Yet most microfinance 
organizations are small. Figure 6 dramatizes the skewed size distribution of MFIs by sorting 
them from smallest to largest and graphing the cumulative number of borrowers against size, ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  21 
using data from a survey by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
60 The 1,813 
smallest MFIs have 10 million loan accounts while the remaining 73 have 40 million.
61 That is, 3% 
of MFIs provide 80% of the loans. 
 
Figure 6. Cumulative number of borrowers by size of lender, circa 2000 
 
Why are so many MFIs so small and so few so large? The reasons are of three sorts. First, some 
MFIs do not prioritize internally funded growth. They may care more about keeping interest 
rates low to help the poorest, covering their losses with grants from public and private donors 
and leaving little in the way of retained earnings for expansion.
62 Second, commercial success is 
about more than product design. MFI staff must also manage their organizations to deploy those 
products efficiently and on a large scale. This section is about what the commercially successful 
ones do. Finally, forces external to MFIs, such as macroeconomic stability, competition, and 
regulation, shape their prospects; these environmental factors are the subject of the next section. 
Managing an MFI for commercial success involves all the usual challenges of business: defining 
job roles, hiring and training, monitoring employee performance, inculcating an appropriate 
culture to motivate staff, wooing investors, and more. Thus, to a significant extent, the keys to 
effective MFI management are universal to business. The nature of the product, however, 
influences specific management choices. This section will review broad management themes with 
an eye toward what they mean for microfinance. Much of the preamble to the review of product 
strategies above applies here: Most of the choices MFI leaders have made are intentional, and 
their astuteness is often underappreciated. In some cases, though, managers have developed or 
copied strategies unaware of their true contribution to the organization's sustainability, but in an ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  22 
evolutionary perspective they are business survival strategies nonetheless. Also, as before, 
exceptions prove the rule. 
The overall picture that emerges is that the successful MFI is a decentralized organization. 
Retail units go to the customer and are the locus of production. They are where relationships 
with clients are made and maintained, where services are provided, where much learning should 
take place about the effectiveness of current approaches, where growth can occur through 
splitting of units. Excessive intervention in branch activities would slow and demoralize workers. 
Management—the center—picks and trains the right people; designs the products and the 
structure of local offices; gives them substantial operational autonomy for the sake of efficiency 
and morale; monitors their performance through strong management information systems (MIS); 
guides them by offering pay incentives and by inculcating a culture of service; and seeks to learn 
continually from experience in the field. 
2.1  Hiring, training, firing 
AS DEMONSTRATED IN Figure 3, operating expenses, as distinct from the cost of capital and loan 
loss provisioning, dominate the cost side of most MFIs' income statements. They in turn consist 
largely of the wages for field staff. That reflects the reality that microfinance to date has been a 
service delivered by people to people, unlike the increasingly automated financial services for the 
better-off. Since the field staff is the heart of any MFI, approaches to hiring, training, and even 
firing are leading determinants of success. 
A common theme in MFI management is the need to break away from "business as usual." 
That can refer to conventional banking, seen as embodying attitudes and assumptions inimical to 
serving the poor. It can refer to the parent company in the case of a downscaling commercial 
bank. It can also refer to a national business culture pervaded by corruption, self-dealing, and 
politically directed lending. A nearly universal response is to hire young people. In Cambodia, for 
example, where corruption is prevalent in commerce and government, ACLEDA Bank says it is 
now the largest recruiter of fresh university graduates in the country.
63 Young people have several 
advantages. They are cheap. They are more idealistic and malleable, so that the social mission of 
microfinance motivates them. They are more willing and able to spend hard hours on the 
"street." They are ready to live campus-style in remote areas. 
Elisabeth Rhyne and Linda S. Rotblatt of Acción International wrote that "good field workers 
are made rather than found, but…a certain level of education and key personal and social traits 
are essential prerequisites."
64 In fact, one way to paraphrase this is to say that good field workers 
are both made and found. Not everyone is cut out for the job. Some characteristics of the ideal 
candidate are subtly contradictory and not always found in the same person. For instance, on the 
one hand, to earn clients' trust and judge their reliability, field workers need good knowledge of 
local communities, best ensured by hiring right from those communities. The workers must also 
like working with people, especially people with difficult lives. On the other hand, MFIs are 
often in a position to skim the cream of local talent. They can choose workers who are better off 
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from countryside to city—and may not want to look back. Susan Gibson, a microfinance training 
consultant, describes what she looks for: 
When I interview people to run programs, I do not ever interview them in the office. When 
they come all [well-dressed,] I say, "Well, we're going to Coronation Market," (this is in 
Kingston, Jamaica). They look at you as though something is wrong with you. They say, "But 
there's crime down there," and I say "that's where we're going to do our microfinance 
program." You can save yourself an incredible amount of time, and you can also learn whether 
that person is well-suited to the job. So we will get on the bus; I would not even take them in 
a vehicle because I expect they will take the bus everyday. I want to see if they have bus fare. 
If they do not have it, they are not accustomed to taking the bus; we might have a problem 
right up front."
65 
So MFIs must strike a difficult balance, hiring educated young loan officers, often from a social 
class above their clients, who view their work as business and not charity, and yet who want to 
work with people less blessed. Gibson again: 
The problem with a lot of microfinance programming around the world is that it comes out 
of a charitable mindset, and you are trying to get people who gave out blankets and food 
distribution to now make loans. It's not a good combination and in many cases, we have had 
to tell people, "you know, this is not for you." You cannot just convert people from a social 
service worker to a loan officer. It doesn't work.
66 
Cost also enters the mix of hiring considerations: workers with professional degrees or prior 
work experience are more expensive. As a result, a trade-off must often be made between skill 
and proximity to clientele, and how best to make it depends greatly on the lending methodology. 
Efficient solidarity group lending consists in no small part in implementing routines. That argues 
for less-skilled workers, closer in social class to the clientele. About 40% of SKS hires, for 
example, are children of clients, and few have any university education.
67 
But efficient individual lenders, as we will discussed, require more independent judgment on 
the part of loan officers, which is why their typical hires are college graduates. These workers 
must assess the quality of the information given by the client, which cannot be taken at face 
value even when supported by financial statements. Good individual loan officers develop 
indirect techniques for getting at the truth, such as asking borrowers about both the value and 
volume of their sales in order to see whether the implied price is realistic. Others can tell a lot 
about a retailer's business by scanning the merchandise on the shelves.
68 Are the shelves empty or 
full, the products new or old? All this requires a habit of critical thinking, of generating 
hypotheses and testing them against evidence. 
For effective MFIs, the tasks of finding and making good field workers intertwine. For no 
candidate is proved until he or she works in the field, and while some training can take place in 
the classroom, much is more effective on the job. This makes recruitment an intensive process 
that plays out over months. As of the mid-1990s, BancoSol in Bolivia put candidates through a 
battery of tests and interviews. At Grameen, between a third and fourth of new hires dropped 
out during the initial probationary period.
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weeks of field and classroom training before deciding whether to channel them into group or 
individual lending operations.
70 
In addition to teaching products and procedures, training transmits a sense of mission, making 
employees feel that they are part of something larger than themselves. In our interviews with 
MFI directors about "secrets" of commercial success, one factor invariably mentioned was a 
shared sense of mission within the organization. Few large organizations anywhere are better 
positioned than MFIs to do it. MFI employees can take pride in their service to the poor and 
their professionalism in a milieu of corruption state-distorted financial sectors. Sense of mission 
motivates long hours. It also spreads excellence by encouraging workers to go beyond the written 
rules of their jobs—to do not just what they have to do but what they can do to improve 
efficiency and serve the customer. Most employees work directly with dozens or hundreds of 
clients a day, so that the mission becomes concrete for them, as multitude of faces and families. 
Serious investment in training is thus a hallmark of commercially successful MFIs. The 
regimen at the ProCredit group, an individual lender, includes five two-week sessions per year for 
the first three years. The company runs a training center near Frankfurt and is planning new ones 
in Ghana and Nicaragua.
71 XacBank in Mongolia maintains a training center with several full 
time staffers at its headquarters and uses distance learning technologies to reach its far-flung 
branches.
72 FINDESA regularly sends employees to training seminars.
73 
A final note on personnel management is that effective MFIs need to be willing to fire, 
especially in the event of fraud. This can be especially difficult in rural East Asia, where cultural 
norms about the importance of saving face are adapted to preventing open ruptures. Historically, 
BRI in Indonesia has sought to avoid firings by transferring or demoting employees, but even it 
will terminate workers for poor performance when other options are exhausted—all the more a 
sign of excellence for its cultural difficulty.
74 
2.2  Going to the customer 
POOR PEOPLE CANNOT afford to travel long distances to meet their bankers. Public 
transportation can be expensive and so is missing a day of work. Besides, their lack of knowledge 
of the formal financial system is a deterrent. A loan officer who comes to the village or 
neighborhood and transacts in public reduces the transaction costs for the borrower even as he 
demonstrates to neighbors that financial services are within their reach too. 
From the lender's perspective, going to the customer helps build relationships, acquire 
information, speed transactions, and enforce compliance. Given the lack of public 
documentation of assets and income, and general lack of credit histories, the loan officer has to 
assess repayment capacity through indirect means: he can observe the lifestyle of clients, talk to 
neighbors about character and integrity, and visit business premises to ascertain repayment 
capacity. Even information regarding the drinking and gambling habits of clients can furnish 
clues about their default risk. FINDESA-Nicaragua loan officers drop by borrowing businesses 
unexpectedly at the end of the day to check if the cash in the register is consistent with the 
business revenue estimate submitted in the credit application. They also know that the financial 
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salary" by looking for evidence of the borrowers' household spending, be it a new motorcycle or 
the size of a home.
75 
On-site loan analysis, combined with the discretionary powers granted to loan officers and 
local branch offices, significantly speeds up the application process. Given the tight budgets of 
poor households, access to quick funding in emergencies carries a great premium, usually 
exploited by moneylenders. Reducing the lag time between loan application and funds 
disbursement, therefore, is critical for MFIs in attracting customers and competing with other 
lenders. FINDESA, for example, strives to be "faster than the competition" by cutting this lag to 
48 hours and by providing repeat customers with smart cards that deliver loans on demand with 
no further approval process.
76 
Last but not the least, access to a customer's home and/or business environment serves an 
important function in terms of delinquency control, especially for individual lenders who cannot 
exert peer pressure through group meetings or through loan co-guarantors. Having a loan officer 
drop by and demand action on a late repayment in front of family, neighbors or business 
associates, or publicly haul out items pledged as collateral, is bound to exert social pressure on 
borrowers even in dense urban areas where social bonds are be weaker than in closed rural 
communities. 
The principle of going to the customer operates in tension with the need to control costs and 
shift them onto clients. The tension is minimal in cities and dense rural areas like in Bangladesh, 
where everyone is close together, but a real barrier in sparse rural areas. In low-density Mongolia, 
XacBank has built a network of branches that reaches into rural secondary towns; market towns, 
after all, have been the locus of commerce in rural areas since ancient times. Still, the ratio 
between overhead costs and clients reached tends to be high in this approach. A modern solution 
is being tried in Kenya. With support from the U.K. Department for International 
Development, Kenya's Equity Building Society has deployed mobile banking units—bullet-proof 
SUVs adorned with solar panels, mobile network–based computer links, and drop-down teller 
windows. Impressively, Equity reports that it is covering the costs of this advanced equipment 
through earnings from new business.
77 
2.3  Standardizing branch structure 
BRANCH STAFFING AT efficient MFIs tends to be tight and uniform, with an organizational 
structure tailored to the context and the services delivered. In Indonesia, the classic BRI branch 
has 4–10 workers under, at the most, five job titles: unit manager, credit officer (responsible for 
loans), teller (occupied primarily with taking deposits), and bookkeeper (likewise), and sometimes 
a guard. In lower-volume areas, branches operate outposts with just a teller and a bookkeeper, 
and are open only a few days a week. Grameen branches have tended to be simpler, reflecting the 
rote nature of solidarity group operations, with a branch manager, sometimes an assistant, and a 
small corps of field officers.
78 
These simple, standardized units facilitate growth. Typically, MFIs grow fastest through 
horizontal expansion, opening branches in new territory, rather than vertical expansion, increasing 
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branches to reproduce like cells, growing for a while by expanding local coverage, then splitting 
in two after territory and clientele reach a certain size. Each new unit is staffed with a 
combination of veterans taking up their accustomed roles and new hires to whom they pass on 
their experience. The decision to split requires relatively little involvement from those further up 
the organizational hierarchy. 
Standardization brings the usual disadvantages and advantages of mass production. It imposes 
some inflexibility, which can impede customer service. But it can make operations efficient 
(section 1.2.6). And it facilitates learning loops between branches and the center: Any aberrations 
that signal trouble or innovation are easier for the center to detect against the backdrop of 
uniformity. And any procedural changes the center issues are meaningful for all branches. 
2.4  Leadership 
FOR AN INDEPENDENT MFI, it almost goes without saying that the drive for success—the 
vision, the mission, the modus operandi, the commitment to continuous improvement—must 
come from the top. For microfinance subsidiaries of downscaling banks, whether domestic or 
international, the need for leadership is worth elaborating on. In fact, two kinds of leadership are 
needed, argues Liza Valenzuela in a report for the U.S. Agency for International Development. 
First, the board and CEO of the parent bank must give the microfinance operation a strong 
mandate, because it breaks from usual bank practices in many ways (such as in the use of pay 
incentives, below), takes time to break even, and is usually not solely justified by its return-risk 
ratio. Such a commitment is evident in the few examples of retail microfinance by international 
banks, such as ABN AMRO, with operations in Brazil, and ANZ Bank, with operations in Fiji. 
Second, there must be an "operational champion," who runs the microfinance unit, understands 
all its facets, and has the stature and skill to advocate for the unit within the larger bank, amidst 
internal competition for capital and autonomy. The leader may also look forward to promotions 
within the bank conditional on his or her success in microfinance. Valenzuela tells a story of an 
effective operational champion in a downscaling bank in Latin America: 
Asked why his bank's microcredit program succeeded, a board champion said he had selected 
one of his finest managers to lead the microcredit unit. The manager was an enthusiastic 
younger man with an excellent understanding of bank products as well as back-office 
operations. He also came from a rural area and understood rural and lower-income clients. 
He was an operational champion, someone who knew what it takes to develop a new product 
line within the bank and could oversee its service delivery. This is a refreshing story, since in 
many other cases the managers selected have lacked the qualities needed to lead a 
microcredit program. In fact, many viewed the microcredit job as a demotion.
79 
A 2006 report surveying the experiences of seven downscaling domestic banks concurs, finding 
that "[m]ost of the successful banks in the analysis had at least one strongly committed 
manager."
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2.5  Monitoring and incentives 
THE MANAGEMENT DISCUSSION so far has looked at how to find, cultivate, and inspire good 
workers. But to achieve excellence, managers must also monitor and guide workers after 
launching them into the field. Collecting data about operations helps them do this. Any signs of 
repayment troubles must be detected and pounced upon quickly. And since workers are involved 
in the collection, they absorb messages about what constitutes good performance. Most 
successful MFIs go beyond collecting performance data to basing a part of employees' pay on it. 
The result is a flow of information which all involved have strong incentives to care about. 
Since a commercially successful MFI's greatest cost is field staff and its greatest risk non-
payment, the most important field worker performance measures to collect are on productivity 
and arrears. Productivity can be measured as accounts per officer or outstanding portfolio per 
officer in currency terms. The first relates more closely to the mission of outreach, while the 
second correlates more with financial sustainability. A second tier of indicators has to do with 
growth, a high priority after financial sustainability; relevant indicators include gross or net 
increase in the number of accounts and gross or net increase in portfolio. The goal, in the words 
of FINDESA head Gabriel Solorzano, is "safe growth."
81 Whatever indicators are chosen, they 
should be few and easy to understand, in order to minimize the administrative burden for all 
concerned and maximize their psychological impact. 
A more sophisticated approach to performance measurement is to treat each retail unit as an 
accounting unit as well, requiring it to generate regular profit and loss statements. P&Ls do not 
suffice by themselves, since they may mask portfolio quality problems or "mission creep" away 
from low-balance clients. But in combination with other indicators, they should align the 
thinking of field workers more closely with the goal of financial sustainability. The pioneer here 
is BRI, which since the inception of the Unit system in 1984 has required regular income 
statements and balance sheets from all branches.
82 
For information to be useful, management information systems (MIS) must be in place to 
transmit it efficiently, reliably, and quickly. In the rich world, good MIS is seen as synonymous 
with high technology. Computers, certainly, should be the nerve center of an MFI's information 
system. But just as an MFI's money flows are not purely electronic (field officers spend much of 
their time transacting in paper cash) neither need their information flows be. Historically, 
primary transaction records at Grameen Bank have been kept on paper. Recently, it has 
accelerated the installation of computers at regional ("area") offices, but it remains to be seen 
how well the new systems will take—how much, that is, this bit of high technology will improve 
information flow.
83 "It is important," wrote Rhyne and Rotblatt in 1994, "to resist the 
temptation to equate a good information system with computerization."
84 Since then, the trend 
does appear to have been toward pushing modern technology out to the branches and leaves of 
the organizational tree. Solorzano at FINDESA speaks of putting personal digital assistants 
(PDAs) in the hands of all field workers.
85 But the point stands: the key is not whether the 
technology is paper or silicon but that it serves the essential functions of MIS. 
However collected, core performance indicators are typically the basis for pay bonuses. By 
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to the organization's social mission. Grameen Bank says it eschews pay incentives for this 
reason.
86 Nevertheless, many MFIs targeting even the poorest through group lending use pay 
incentives. The fast-growing, profitable Compartamos in Mexico uses them for both its 
individual and village banking field workers.
87 Bonuses are almost universal among successful 
individual lenders because they solve what economists call an information problem. In particular, 
for the sake of efficiency, individual loan officers must be given more discretion to exercise their 
own judgment in factoring different kinds of (imperfect) information into loan decisions, 
especially if they work on the streets, where the clients are. It would be costly for managers to 
attempt to observe and second-guess every choice they make, so managers cannot be sure field 
workers are making the best choices. It becomes that much more important to guide their 
behavior through pay based on results. 
Effective pay incentives must possess three characteristics, according to Sebastian von 
Stauffenberg of MicroRate, an MFI rating agency.
88 They should be significant enough for field 
workers to care about them. They should be simple, because it is hard for people to respond to 
formulas they do not understand. And they should be high-frequency, so that performance 
affects pay relatively soon. In addition, the basis for incentives needs to be carefully aligned with 
the MFIs ultimate objectives. Rewarding loan officers only for the number of new accounts 
opened each month, for example, could tilt operations dangerously in the direction of over-
lending, even fraud. This, Eduardo Bazoberry reports, once happened at PRODEM in Bolivia, 
which he runs.
89 Bazoberry was burned enough by the experience to abandon pay incentives. 
That put him out of step with most successful individual microlenders but illustrates the risks. 
Managers at many effective MFIs view incentive formulas as reins to guide operations. Just as 
when riding a horse, they can tweak the reins to steer the organization. If they perceive that 
branches are lending too conservatively, with near-perfect repayment records but slow growth, 
they can gingerly adjust the incentives to favor growth more, then observe how it affects behavior 
and performance. In an interesting variant, BRI managers adjust the transfer prices (interest 
rates) on capital flows between branches and the center. During a nationwide liquidity crunch in 
1991, for example, they raised the interest rate paid to branches for mobilized savings. That 
showed up on the branches' income statements, and since employees shared in the branches' 
profits, they responded by shifting their energies from the lending program, which temporarily 
stopped growing, to the savings business. After the credit squeeze passed, BRI managers flipped 
the incentives to restart lending growth.
90 Managers can also use this technique to mask the 
subsidy element in the capital they secure, setting transfer prices closer to market rates to 
promote efficiency. 
2.6  Organizational capacity for learning 
IT IS WELL recognized in rich industrial countries that an organization's capacity for change, or 
"learning," is essential to success, even survival. The context in which organizations operate is 
constantly changing—competition arrives, technology advances, or, at MFIs, clients outgrow the 
strictures of the lending ladder—and so organizations must change too. Even if the context were 
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as continually pursued. And treating employees respectfully, as sources of knowledge, boosts 
morale. 
One striking thing about leaders of successful MFIs that we spoke to is the extent to which 
they had imbibed these rich-world management ideals as they sought to create world-class 
institutions. Solorzano said FINDESA models itself after successful Japanese corporations, such 
as the car companies who imported just-in-time delivery and total quality management from the 
West—and then implemented them better than any had before. FINDESA executives visited 
Peru to study its well-developed microfinance regulatory system, to Bolivia to understand why 
some MFIs came through the late-1990s microfinance crisis better than others, to Mexico to 
learn from Compartamos, to El Salvador to study a more local example, and to Harvard to study 
management. In the Japanese model, he says, learning has three parts: class-room learning, on-
the-job training, and "self-illumination."
91 
Organizational learning takes many forms, differing in subject (who is learning), object (what is 
being learned about), and source (internal or external). One kind of learning is about how to 
improve processes, which Japanese manufacturers exemplify. Excellent MFIs obsess over field 
officers' time use. In the case of individual lenders, as they mature, the size of a typical client file 
shrinks radically, in the experience of Sebastian von Stauffenberg.
92 Over time, they learn how to 
zero in on a few pieces of information that can be used to accurately gauge a potential borrower's 
creditworthiness. Paralleling this is a reduction in how many people are involved in a loan 
decision and how long it takes to make. 
Another kind of learning is learning from without, imbibing from the great world of experience 
and ideas in management and microfinance. Vikram Akula founded SKS in India after observing 
self-help groups and lenders such as Grameen for years—and watching how Coca-Cola made 
itself ubiquitous in India in 15 years through mass production of a standardized product.
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Still another kind of learning, as Solorzano says, is learning from within. As organizations that 
mass produce services delivered through large field staffs, power in successful MFIs necessarily 
flows from the top down. A strong hierarchy dictates standards for products and procedures. Yet 
knowledge must also flow from the bottom up. Field staff and local branch managers possess the 
most direct knowledge of what works and what doesn't, of how things are changing on the 
ground. Consulting them also raises their morale and helps them buy in to any policy changes 
that emanate from the top. And staff that buy into a policy change are more likely to carry it out 
with efficiency and excellence. Ultimately, a learning organization is not just a collection of people 
who learn, but a corporate entity capable of changing in response to new information. 
Effective MFI managers therefore develop a culture and procedures that let them learn from 
staff. Managers at all levels spend time in the field. Regular staff meetings at branches are 
occasions for local managers to discuss problems and innovations, and similar meetings up the 
hierarchy facilitate knowledge transmission. Grameen Bank takes an unusual approach: branch 
managers are required to write monthly essays about conditions in their area, recent successes, 
challenges, and so on. The essays are sent straight to top management, bypassing the 
intermediate levels in the hierarchy. "Observers have credited this system with ensuring that the 
policy makers at Grameen have a detailed grasp of the status of their organization."
94 Certainly, 
Grameen has demonstrated impressive capacity to learn in the organizational sense in recent ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  30 
years. In response to outside criticism, repayment problems, and pressure from clients given 
added voice by competition—and despite its size—it carried out the thoroughgoing "Grameen 
II" reforms in a few years.
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3  Enabling environment 
WE BEGIN THIS section as we began the last, with an observation about the uneven distribution 
of microfinance in the world. This time, we organize the data geographically to highlight that a 
few countries have a lot but most have little. (SeeTable 3.) As we have said, the pioneers who 
created successful MFIs in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Bolivia, and elsewhere deserve much credit, as 
it were, for their vision, creativity, intelligence, and stamina. But equally talented people work in 
countries with little microfinance activity. Moreover, since the 1990s, bilateral and multilateral 
donors have promoted microfinance in countries with sizable informal sectors. Currently they 
disburse are $0.5–1.0 billion a year for microfinance.
96 International networks like Acción, 
Women's World Banking, and the Grameen Foundation have also been active in forming 
alliances with local NGOs—either "start-ups" focused on microlending or older, broad focus 
social development organizations interested in starting credit programs. Furthermore, private 
capital funds, attracted by the microfinance success stories, have become active in supporting 
microfinance initiatives, and domestic commercial banks have also explored downscaling. And 
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Table 3. Active microcredit accounts per capita, countries with at least 1%, circa 2000 
 
Country Loan accounts Population Loan accounts/ 
(%)
Bangladesh 17,300 130,407                   13.3 
Indonesia 15,159 224,138                    6.8 
Guatemala 833 12,820                    6.5 
Bolivia 494 8,153                     6.1 
Nicaragua 220 4,932                    4.5 
Gambia 50 1,367                    3.6 
Tunisia 313 9,564                    3.3 
Niger 322 10,174                    3.2 
El Salvador 191 6,123                     3.1 
Honduras 183 6,201                    3.0 
Thailand 1,728 62,352                    2.8 
Ecuador 345 12,505                    2.8 
Sri Lanka 524 19,239                    2.7 
Malawi 260 10,874                    2.4 
Senegal 233 9,784                    2.4 
Mongolia 61 2,601                    2.3 
Peru 588 25,980                    2.3 
Nepal 492 24,702                    2.0 
Cambodia 243 12,433                    2.0 
Benin 122 6,428                     1.9 
Togo 90 5,033                     1.8 
Colombia 699 39,686                     1.8 
Uganda 407 23,496                     1.7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 59 3,836                     1.5 
Paraguay 69 5,586                     1.2 
Dominican Republic 97 8,354                     1.2 
Georgia 54 4,777                     1.1 
Samoa 2 179                     1.0 
Ethiopia 638 62,651                     1.0 
            (thousands)
Source: Authors' calculations, based on CGAP.  
 
Given such widespread support, why then the uneven geographic distribution of microfinance? 
Positive feedback loops are part of the story. It is easier to do microfinance where it has already 
been done because clients and regulators have learned how to work with it. Demonstration 
models are in place and investors are attracted to success. But there is more to the story than 
that. A country's history, as manifest in its economic regime, culture, and government—is a 
major determinant of commercial success in microfinance. 
3.1  Positive feedback loops: microfinance begets microfinance 
ONE COMMON THREAD in the stories of countries with MFI success is the demonstration 
model, the first MFI to attain large outreach and financial viability. It is an example of the ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  32 
broader phenomenon of positive feedback, of microfinance begetting microfinance. The 
demonstration model does several things. It creates public awareness of microfinance. Especially 
if it is an NGO, the organization's civil society credentials can promote public acceptance of 
financially viable styles of microfinance, in particular the necessity of charging high interest. This 
function can be especially important in democracies with a tradition of state subsidized programs 
of poverty alleviation because some MFI practices can be easily politicized. Given the diversity 
of credit methodologies and organizational structures, and the importance of creating market-
responsive products, others can learn immensely through the experiences and innovations of the 
first MFI that successfully tests the waters. Also, if the pioneer is a private MFI, whether for-
profit or non-profit, the response of the public sector to private microfinance initiatives—helpful 
or hostile—becomes evident. 
NGOs have perhaps the easiest time pioneering microfinance. But some downscaling state 
banks, such as BRI, are also well-positioned to take the lead, since they can start with financial 
muscle, large branch networks, public credibility, and a minimum of worries about regulatory 
barriers. They can also offer deposit services. Downscaling commercial banks have some of these 
advantages, but the potential for destructive politicization makes it is harder for easily-
scapegoated foreign ones to serve as the pioneers. 
The demonstration model also shapes the institutional form of microfinance. If the initial 
success story is an NGO, other NGOs might be set up; if the lead NGO moved on to become a 
non-bank finance company (NBFC) or bank, then others will again follow. For new entrants have 
to compete with the kind of services being provided by the existing MFIs. If the demonstration 
model is a downscaling state bank or a microfinance bank able to mobilize savings, say, a credit-
only NGO might be a weak competitor. Potentially more-successful entrants in such a market 
would be other downscaling banks. 
Positive feedback works its way through other channels. The rise of microfinance forces legal 
and regulatory adaptations, which opens the way for further growth. The idea of microfinance 
spreads through communities, so that new entrants need not work so hard to explain what they 
offer. Success in a country attracts public donors and private investors. In this respect, 
microfinance is like most explosive phenomena, from the spread of mobile phones to the spread 
of disease to the acceleration of chip speeds. All are driven by positive feedback loops.  
3.2  National context 
ACCEPTING THE IMPORTANCE of positive feedback loops, the uneven international distribution 
of microfinance still begs a question: why do certain countries enter the virtuous cycle while 
others never get past small-scale attempts? The hindrances are economic, cultural, and political. 
We touch upon some chief examples here. 
3.2.1  Wage rates 
High formal sector wages strain the economics of microfinance. Again, operations dominate the 
cost structure of MFIs, and consist largely of wages for loan officers. If pay rates for these 
officers are high relative to the incomes of target clients, MFIs may be faced with a choice ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  33 
between charging very high rates or lending larger sums, presumably to less-poor people. Thus 
the national supply-demand balances for jobs at various skill levels shape the cost structures of 
lending methodologies. They help determine how far down the income ladder the methodologies 
can teach, and how much they compete with each other. 
Both the determinants of these wage rates and their effects on microfinance economics are 
complex. One factor behind wage rates is the overall economic inequality in a society. In South 
Asia, societies are relatively equal and this particular aids the economics of lower-skilled group 
methodologies, for which high school graduates often suffice. In Bangladesh, formal sector jobs 
that loan officers qualify for are low-level clerical jobs in government. Salaries for these jobs are 
low compared to per capita income, relative to other parts of the world, and the demand for 
them far outstrips supply. By matching the public sector pay scale, Bangladeshi MFIs keep costs 
low, but still assure themselves a steady supply of loan officers. In 1991, when the government of 
Bangladesh increased government salaries by 50 percent, Grameen had to follow suit.
97 Given the 
relative scarcity of public sector jobs, it is doubtful that Grameen would have lost any significant 
number of employees to the public sector if it hadn't matched the public sector salary increase—
it would, however, have lost employee loyalty and undermined its institutional culture. In Latin 
American, where the rich-poor gap is wider, individual lenders find economic viability, at least in 
the poorer Latin nations, by hiring university graduates from urban centers and making much 
bigger loans. Meanwhile, relatively high inequality in African countries, manifest as a few rich 
people, many extremely poor people, and a tiny middle class of educated workers, may help 
explain why microfinance has struggled on the continent. 
3.2.2  Competition from the non-MFI private sector 
In richer developing countries, notably in Latin America and Eastern Europe, MFIs are not the 
only game in town when it comes to formal, privately provided credit. One damper on 
microfinance growth in Brazil, for example, is a robust consumer credit industry. Microfinance is 
seemingly the quintessential example of selling to the "bottom of the pyramid." But the first case 
study in C.K. Prahalad's Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid is not of an MFI, but of Casas Bahia, 
a large Brazilian company that sells consumer goods to poor people on credit. Michael Klein, son 
of founder and Holocaust survivor Samuel Klein, describes the vision behind the company: 
When my father arrived in Brazil, he realized the average population was not wealthy. 
Thousands of people were migrating from the northeast region to work in São Paolo….This 
population needed all kinds of basic goods, such as linens, towels, and sheets. My father's 
vision was to fulfill the needs of the poor population. But how could they pay for it? The 
answer was simple: financing.
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Casa Bahia is today the Wal-Mart of Brazil, and 80% of its sales occur on installment credit. As a 
consumer lender, Casas Bahia does use collateral, namely the things sold. As for MFIs that take 
collateral, repossessing a television or refrigerator is expensive. But the mere threat of the loss—
amplified by the public embarrassment of a Casas Bahia truck pulling up in front of one's house 
to exact it—generally suffices to assure repayment. Casas Bahia's installment credit also ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  34 
comports better with Brazilian ideas about finance. In Portuguese, empréstimos, or loans, are what 
MFIs and other cash lenders provide; the word carries negative connotations because borrowers 
ultimately pay more than the face value of the money they receive. In contrast, crédito, or credit, 
emphasizes the idea of just committing to pay for something—later. In a detailed study of 
financial services in Brazil, Bonnie Brusky and João Paulo Fortuna write, "While it is widely 
recognized and understood that buying on payment plans is in the end more costly than taking a 
loan, when the choice is available it is rarely made in favor of a loan."
99 Given that microcredit 
often finances consumption, the presence of the likes of Casa Bahia does narrow the scope for 
standard microfinance. 
3.2.3  Economic and political competition from subsidized government credit 
One distinguishing characteristic of microfinance has been the way it involves people from rich 
countries, who advise and finance it. So much does microfinance fill the field of vision of those 
from rich countries that it can come as a shock to learn that it still provides only a minority of 
financial services to the poor in developing countries, largely because of large government credit 
programs in China, India, Vietnam, and other Asian nations. (See Table 4.) 
These government programs tend to be subsidized, and competition from them poses a real 
challenge for MFIs. It can crowd out MFIs—though how much is hard to judge since historically 
much of it has ended up in the hands of people outside the target population. More importantly, 
the low interest rates and poor repayment that usually characterize directed credit programs 
create a culture of easy "credit" that can make it hard for MFIs to control their delinquency 
levels and politically defend their interest rates. Those who do not gain access to government-
subsidized credit end up resenting having to pay the higher MFI interest rates. Such resentment 
is a ready base for politicization of high MFI interest rates. 
While the failure of directed credit programs highlights the strengths of the market-oriented 
microfinance model, in many countries the failure is perceived not as an intrinsic feature of 
subsidized credit but, rather, as a result of the mismanagement of the government at the time, thus 
leaving the door open for new directed credit projects with improved delivery systems to be 
initiated by the latest government—which it will do when it is seeking reelection. In such 
situations, the public sector continues to be viewed as a better solution than the market for 
pulling people out of poverty. 
A history of directed credit also creates vested interests in the shape of public sector bank 
managers and employees and the politicians that typically run the local branch of the state bank 
as if it were part of their general municipal operations. These vested interests can influence 
government policy into creating a non-supportive MFI environment. The history of India's 
directed credit program goes back to 1954, when a central bank report recommended expanding 
the rural cooperative system to provide financial access to what is now called the informal 
sector.
100 Commercial banks were nationalized in 1969 and rural regional banks were set up in 
1976 to further extend the rural reach of financial institutions. India today has a vast network of 
rural financial institutions: over 32,000 rural branches of commercial banks and regional rural 
banks, some 14,000 cooperative bank branches and 98,000 primary agricultural credit societies, 
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services.
101 Government support for the SHG bank linkage program, discussed in section 1.1.1, 
continues this history. 
Unlike the SHG bank linkage program, however, the Grameen replicators in India directly 
challenge the state banking infrastructure because of their independence and greater scalability. 
If MFIs achieve broader rural outreach and gain public support, they will undermine the raison 
d'être of the rural directed credit system. In March 2006, addressing a committee of bankers, the 
Chief Minister of the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh accused MFIs of charging "moneylender" 
interest rates and "unethical recovery measures."
102 Two months later, the same Chief Minister 
launched a state credit plan to provide funding to SHGs and told reporters that the government 
was considering regulating MFI interest rates.
103 In India, the image of a ruthless, cunning, rural 
moneylender charging usurious rates and pushing the poor to acts of desperation, even suicide, 
has long persisted in the public imagination and has made it easier for politicians to harness this 
sentiment to their own goals.
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Table 4. Number of small-balance loan accounts by region and institution type, circa 2000 
Region  MFIs
 Co-ops and 
credit   Rural banks
 State/ agricultural/ 
development banks  Total 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3,956 857 33 348 5,193
East Asia and Pacific 18,292 1,069 3,147 65,624 88,133
China 153 18 46,570 46,741
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 430 90 28 548
Latin America and Caribbean 4,464 655 162 51 5,332
Middle East and North Africa 909 11 5,912 6,832
South Asia 22,366 355 1,467 22,030 46,217
India 3,961 51 19,748 23,760
Total 50,415 3,037 4,809 93,994 152,255
Share of grand total (%) 33 2 3 62 100
Source: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), “Financial Institutions with a ‘Double Bottom Line’: 
Implications for the Future of Microfinance,” Occasional Paper 8, July 2004.  
3.2.4 Macroeconomic stability 
Economic crises can destroy jobs and throw people into the informal sector where they must 
survive by their wits. In this unhappy way, economic instability expands the market for 
microfinance.
105 But MFIs, like most businesses, can hardly thrive in an uncertain climate. Most 
of all, they need a stable currency. Bolivia's microcredit demonstration model, the NGO 
PRODEM, was founded in 1986, barely a year after inflation hit a record high of 24,000% and a 
new government instituted drastic economic liberalization measures to stabilize the economy, 
including deregulation of interest rates. Inflation fell to 14% by 1987. During the 1990's, the 
decade that Bolivian microfinance achieved its remarkable success, economic growth recovered 
and inflation remained well below the 1987 level. By 1998, Bolivian microfinance providers served 
416,000 clients, accounting for over half of all clients served by the Bolivian financial system.
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Fortunately inflation is in abeyance worldwide at the moment. In the 1980s a typical 30 countries 
recorded inflation rates above 20% in any given year. In 2004, just four did.
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3.2.5 Regulatory environment 
Subsidized credit is not the only public policy that sets the environment for microfinance. 
Another factor is the tenor of banking regulations and supervision, which can easily quash 
microfinance if it imposes norms from conventional banking. To quote Damian von 
Stauffenberg, founder of MicroRate: 
A relatively well-developed financial system and above all, reasonably functioning banking 
laws and institutions that enforce them form a combination that is usually lethal to the 
emergence of microfinance. Banking supervisors have firm ideas about who should be 
engaged in financial intermediation and they will nip anything that doesn't conform to those 
ideas in the bud. It takes a determined political decision—as occurred under Fujimori in Peru 
and under Gonzalez de Lozada in Bolivia—to change banking laws and to knock the banking 
supervisors into a cooperative mood. Unfortunately most governments that jump onto the 
microfinance bandwagon don't realize that the most important thing they can do is boring, 
largely invisible technical and supervisory work. They want publicity. So they go for lending 
rate controls and large injections of subsidized funds. Both are poison for microfinance.
108 
A particular threat is a politicization of microfinance that leads to interest rate caps. The 
tendency is latent in almost all societies and can suddenly come to the fore even in countries 
where microfinance seems well on its way to success. In Nicaragua, the fifth country on the list 
in Table 3, the parliament introduced interest rate ceilings in 2001.
109 Few in the general public 
understand the business necessity of MFIs charging cost-covering interest rates that happen to 
be considerably higher than formal market rates. It does seem unfair that the poor have to pay a 
40% interest rate when the rich pay 10%. (And scrutiny of MFI rates and practices, such as in 
Andhra Pradesh, is not entirely unhealthy.) Making the justification harder is the relative paucity, 
to date, of conclusive studies vouching for the positive economic and social impact of 
microfinance (see the Conclusion). Absent such clear evidence supporting the poverty alleviation 
properties of microfinance, both the necessity and the difficulty of gaining popular support will 
remain a challenge for MFIs and a tool in the arsenal of vested interests opposed to 
microfinance. 
The good news is that microfinance itself is a force for policy change. An important part of the 
Bolivia success was not only that banking supervisory agency was one of the best in Latin 
America by the late 1990s, but that it actually was responsive to the needs of microfinance when 
PRODEM spawned the first full-fledge microfinance bank there, BancoSol. For example, it 
accommodated BancoSol's violation of traditional collateral requirements, understanding that 
"unsecured" microloans could be safe.
110 And during the microcredit crisis in 1999–2000, when 
competition among MFIs and consumer lenders led to over-lending and a delinquency epidemic, 
the agency extended its credit bureau to lower-income people.
111 These innovations, prodded by 
the rise of the microfinance pioneers, allowed further growth; again microfinance begat 
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The broader regulatory milieu also affects microfinance. The government of Turkey, for 
example, evinces a generally hostile attitude toward small enterprises, including MFIs, favoring 
large-scale projects in its development strategy.
112 In 2002, KEDV, a Turkish NGO, set up a for-
profit company, Maya Enterprise for Microfinance, to start a lending program. Maya received 
permission to operate after a lengthy application process, yet it is still in legal limbo. While not a 
bank, Maya is subject to banking tax laws.
113 A draft law submitted in 2003 and still under 
consideration three years later proposes regulations for licensing microfinance banks and allows 
NGOs to lend but does not permit them to own equity in microfinance banks. Worse, it seems 
that what not expressly permitted there is de facto prohibited, where in other countries the 
default tends to go the other way. This seriously constrains NGO MFIs, reducing incentives for 
donors to fund local NGOs interested in microlending. To date, Maya is the only MFI in 
Turkey, a country of 69 million people, with a stated goal of pursuing financial viability. At the 
end of 2005 it had 1,301 active borrowers.
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4  Conclusion 
MICROFINANCE LEADERS HAVE developed a suite of techniques in product design and 
management that solve the business problems of controlling costs, building volume, keeping 
repayment high, and preventing fraud, all in countries with weak infrastructure and human 
capital. Most of these techniques were invented, others stumbled upon. Through a process of 
selection—and in environments friendly to microfinance—the strategies came to the fore for 
what were predominantly business reasons—the MFIs that followed them became "success 
stories" in a commercial sense, growing large. For example, the ubiquity of credit, as opposed to 
savings, seems to have arisen for practical reasons, yet some now call it a human right. 
Our focus has been on commercial success. But hardly a dollar goes into microfinance that is 
not motivated in part by the desire to help the poor. True success is contributing to 
development. Commercial success is a distinct notion, but the findings of this report about 
commercial success have implications for thinking about the success of microfinance in the 
broader sense. 
To understand why, one needs to appreciate that how much microfinance helps people is a 
complex and unsettled matter. It is natural to view the growing clientele and high repayments of 
MFIs as signs that microfinance works—that fears of debt traps are overblown. People are 
voluntary partaking of it, and must be doing something right if they are able to repay. Even if 
they are not investing the loan monies in enterprises with returns that cover the interest, they 
may be using the funds to smooth consumption, a clinical term that can mean not going to bed 
hungry so much. Moreover, growing availability of high-quality financial services, like health and 
education services, is clearly part of economic development. There is much to be said for this line 
of argument, for trusting the wisdom of the clients. And to the extent that enriching the 
financial fabric of a country is development, commercial success is almost automatically true 
development. Certainly, institutions such as BancoSol, Grameen, and BRI are remarkable for 
their scale and dynamism. ROODMAN & QURESHI: MICROFINANCE AS BUSINESS  38 
Yet similar things might be said for moneylenders—people have used their services for 
millennia—or even tobacco companies moving into developing countries. These analogies are 
explosive and may be inapt. But they demonstrate the logical shortcoming of equating patronage 
with success—especially for microfinance investors who define success as direct benefits for 
clients. 
This ambiguity argues for more rigorous evaluation of the impact of microfinance. The need 
for good evaluation of development projects such as microfinance is not news. What seems 
underappreciated, however, is that rigorous evaluation of how microfinance affects the poor 
(which differs from evaluation of how poor microfinance clients are) is rather scarce.
115 There are 
several reasons for this. First, rigorous evaluation is more difficult and expensive than tracking 
loan repayment or even surveying clients to assess how well off they are. Presented with a 
prospering microcredit client and a struggling non-client, one could explain the difference in 
many ways. The MFI may have selected villages or slums, or people within them, that seem most 
promising. Or selection may operate on the client side, with the more prosperous more likely to 
borrow and the less prosperous more likely to stay away—or drop out after trying it, thus 
disappearing from the evaluator's radar.
116 Careful evaluation distinguishes these stories from the 
one of interest, that microfinance is contributing to the prosperity of the client. That turns out 
to require extensive data collection, such as survey of hundreds of client and non-client 
households; and, ideally, a randomized implementation of the microfinance program studied, in 
order to rule out the possibility, say, that the MFI is just giving credit to those who would 
succeed anyway. 
Another disincentive to rigorous evaluation is that it is a "public good": its costs are borne by a 
few institutions even when it benefits the entire microfinance community. If the institutions 
funding the evaluation are unlikely to reap most of its benefit, they are less likely to fund it. This 
might seem a strange assertion given that most of the backers of microfinance are in it for the 
public good; seemingly, aid agencies and foundations should be eager to generate knowledge on 
what works. This brings us to the third barrier to evaluation: incentives within funding agencies 
and MFIs. In general, people within these bodies feel they have more to lose from an unfavorable 
evaluation that they have to gain from a favorable one. 
The upshot, from a decade or so of microfinance evaluation, is a handful of high-quality 
studies. The chapter on impacts in the 2005 textbook, The Economics of Microfinance, by 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, essentially finds two good studies, both of group lending, 
that find positive impact.
117 One of the two cited by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, done 
in Northeast Thailand, found few statistically significant signs of impact of village banking, 
except among borrowers on the banks' organizing committees. One explanation is that only 
these connected borrowers obtained loans large enough that they could reasonably be expected 
to make a difference.
118 The other study is based on surveys of 1,800 households in Bangladesh 
carried out in 1991–92 and 1998–99, with backing from the World Bank. It finds that microcredit 
for women increased their incomes by 8 taka for each 100 lent.
119 Thus a $250 one-year loan 
would raise a borrower's income by $12.50/year, or about $0.03/day. For someone living on 
$2/day, that is a 1.5% increase. This does not live up to the microfinance hype, but it is a modest, 
positive impact.
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Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman have performed the first randomized study of small-scale 
credit, specifically, of a payday lender in South Africa; they found that extending credit to those 
just falling short on the credit scoring system raised borrowers' employment rates and 
income.
121On the other hand, the high-profile "AIMS" impact studies funded by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development either found no impact or did find it only to have the results 
undone by other researchers correcting methodological problems.
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Microcredit, like all credit, must help some people—one hopes, the majority of clients. And 
like all credit, especially when pushed hard by suppliers, microcredit must hurt some clients too. 
This complexity is no more a reason to attack microcredit per se than is personal bankruptcy in 
rich countries a cause for banning credit cards or adjustable-rate mortgages. But in combination 
with the observation that commercial imperatives can explain so much about microfinance, it is 
cause for reflection. By Occam's razor—if two hypotheses explain the evidence, the simpler one 
is more credible—the power of commercial imperatives to explain so many product design 
choices weakens an alternative explanation for them, namely that they are made primarily to help 
clients. Of course, a better way to distinguish the two hypotheses is with direct evidence. More 
good studies are needed, not least of individual lending, and of services other than credit. 
For commercial banks, nontraditional entrants into microfinance, there are some important 
twists to this general caution. First, if the evidence of benefit is weak, there is a risk that public 
perceptions of microcredit will flip; the rhetoric of empowerment might even give way to that of 
enslavement, as it did in the Jubilee 2000 movement to cancel the debt of poor nations. Once, 
the donors who made those loans were the "good guys" in public perception. Today, there are 
signs of such a challenge to microcredit in Andhra Pradesh, Bolivia, and elsewhere. The new 
Bolivian president, for one, called for sweeping debt forgiveness.
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Second, it is not necessarily optimal for banks to copy methodologies developed by non-banks. 
In particular, to the extent that the traditional emphasis on credit is an adaptive response to the 
difficulty NGOs face in taking deposits, rather than a demonstratively superior way to relieve the 
capital constraints of the poor, banks should not continue the tradition unquestioningly. They 
should seriously consider a greater emphasis on savings. The government-controlled BRI Unit 
system, recall, had 32.3 million deposit accounts to 3 million loan accounts at the end of 2005. 
Banks have a competitive advantage in savings. And unlike with credit, there seems little reason 
to worry that savings harms some clients. 
We should not lose sight of the fact that commercially successful microfinance institutions are 
remarkable organizations, employing hundreds or thousands of people at tasks once thought 
impossible. They operate in difficult circumstances and are relatively accountable to their clients. 
They are what William Easterly calls "searchers," incrementally developing responses to the 
problems of poverty, their efforts channeled by some accountability to those whom they seek to 
help.
124 They enrich the institutional fabric of their nations. So even if microcredit does not live 
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